By: Rizwan Zeb
It was the failure of the Operation Parakram which led to a rethink in the Indian strategic community. The Indian defense establishment realized that the failure to achieve any objectives of the operation was mainly due to the long delay between the mobilization order and the actual deployment of the strike corps on the international border. Two things went against the Indians: although India had a lot of moral support in the wake of the Indian parliament attacks but by the time the Indian troops were ordered to mobilize and the mobilization, Pakistan successfully counter mobilized; and the world community intervened. Another important factor was that, first, the Indian political leadership failed to set clear objectives and second, they crumbled under intense international pressure.
This analysis necessitated a need for a new war doctrine for India. After almost two years of home work, the Indian military came up with a new war doctrine: the cold start doctrine in April 2004. The underlying theme of this limited war doctrine is that the Indian army through a conventional strike (s) would inflict considerable damage to Pakistan, keeping the level of hostilities well below the nuclear threshold and with maximum speed, minimizing the chances of international intervention before the Indian army is able to achieve its objectives. This doctrine is a clear departure from the earlier ‘Sundarji Doctrine.’ According to the cold start doctrine, the Indian army will no more try to cut Pakistan into two; instead, it will try to achieve shallow territorial gains which then will be used as a bargaining chip.
According to details, as per the cold start doctrine, Indian Army (for its war with Pakistan) instead of three large strike corps will be divided into eight smaller division-sized “integrated battle groups” ( IBGs). These integrated battle groups will have maximum air and naval support. The key elements of this doctrine are speed and surprise. And the underlying objective is to firmly take position on ground and achieve objectives before Pakistan can counter mobilize and its allies or the world powers can intervene. It is also assumed that with eight IBGs, Pakistan will face serious difficulty in gathering real time intelligence about all of them in keeping with its limited reconnaissance resources. Another important aim of this doctrine is to keep the war under the nuclear redlines of Pakistan and even if Pakistan decides to use nuclear weapons against the advancing Indian troops, provide it with smaller targets. Added to this according to the Indian calculation is that any nuclear attack if at all is conducted by Pakistan, it will be in its own territory.
There are a number of factors in this thinking that can destabilize the strategic stability in South Asia: first, Pakistan will come under tremendous pressure to retaliate and there is no way that the Indians can guarantee that the Pakistan will keep the war limited. As there will be no time for intervention, Pakistan will have to exercise its options.
With the increasing imbalance between India and Pakistan in conventional capabilities, Pakistan’s reliance on its nuclear weapons is most likely to increase. The conventional imbalance coupled with an attack as per the cold start doctrine will further lower the nuclear threshold for Pakistan. The key question in such a situation would be can the Indian be 100 % sure that a conventional attack on Pakistan will remain limited to a conventional level. Why will Pakistan play according to the Indian rules of the game? Although, Pakistan has not clearly defined its nuclear redlines, however, Lt. General (retd) Kidwai in a widely quoted interview has given certain pointers to situation under which Pakistan might contemplate using its nuclear weapons. According to General Kidwai, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons if: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically.
Pakistan obviously can not ignore the cold start doctrine and will develop contingencies of its own. Pakistan will under no circumstances, will let the Indians attempt to capture its territory with out fighting with all possible means. An operational cold start will not only destabilize the region as Pakistan will take counter measures, it will also lower the Pakistani threshold to use nuclear weapons in any future war. This might also be a point where Pakistan might contemplate developing tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s war doctrine revolves around the offensive defense and in any future war; Pakistan will take the war into the Indian Territory. What would the Indians do then? Will they expand the war, which then, may not remain limited?
The point which the Indian military establishment is missing is that there is no guarantee that a limited war will remain limited. Which ever side will be losing will try to salvage itself by using any mean at its disposal. There is every likelihood that a limited war will expand to an unlimited war. Two questions are very important here: what objectives will be achieved by waging a limited war? And second, what measures by the Indian military will be taken to ensure that a limited war will remain limited? Mercifully, few in the Indian establishment understand these dilemmas. According to one Indian official, “The idea that Pakistan will cooperate in a conflict and comply with India’s wishes to fight a limited war is ridiculous. It will be naturally in [Pakistan’s] interest to keep any conflagration as unlimited as possible.”
While cold start has a potential to highly destabilize the already not too stabilized nuclear south Asia, there is a civil-military dimension to it as well. The Indian civilian leadership exercises strict control over the defense matters yet they hardly provide any concrete guidance to the Indian military. This is some thing which the Indian military is critical about and this is perhaps the main reason behind the cold start doctrine. Any war waged under this doctrine will make it impossible for the Indian political leadership to retract from under international pressure which according to the Indian military was the main reason behind the unsuccessful Operation Parakram. During that, on two occasions, Indian army wanted to attack Pakistan which was not approved by the Indian leadership.
And this is why the Indian political leadership will be reluctant to own the cold start doctrine as it will give the Indian military an enhanced role in the decision-making. What ever course cold start doctrine and related debate will take in India and else where is yet to be seen but what is clear is that it will not only have adverse effect on strategic stability in South Asia but will also redefine civil-military relations in India.
Comments (0)
Pakistan Review
http://pakistanreview.com/./public_html/article.php?story=20100401005925335