

Pak-U.S. Relations During Musharraf Regime



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Candidate's Declaration

I hereby declare that the thesis presently submitted entitled as “Pak-U.S. Relations during Musharraf's Regime” is the result of my own research and has not been submitted by any other institute for any degree.

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Supervisor's Declaration

I hereby declare that BS candidate Muhammad Mohsin has completed his bachelor's thesis titled "Pak-U.S. Relations During Musharraf's Regime" under my supervision. I recommended it for the submission for the degree Bachelor of Science in History.

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Dedication

To my Parents

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Abstract

The present study is an attempt to explore the history of Pakistan and United States relations starting from 1947 to Musharraf's era, the main focus of this study is events of 9/11. Terrorist attacks on United States on September 9, 2001, was a turning point in the relations of both countries. Before this both countries had many ups and downs in their relations. Both countries tried their best to gain benefits from each other. Pakistan as an ally of United States fought against the terrorism as a front-line state. Therefore, no country in the world has suffered more than in this war than Pakistan. This study first briefly describes the history of Pakistan and US relations from 1947 to pre-9/11 era. After that the event of 9/11 and its impacts on the Pak-U.S. relations is discussed in detail.

Introduction

Foreign policy of any state plays a very important role in its internal and external affairs. Pakistan is situated in a very interesting geographic location and due to this, its foreign policy have many ups and downs. The United States was one of those countries which recognized Pakistan immediately after its independence. On August 15, 1947, the U.S. President Harry S. Truman congratulated Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General of the dominion of Pakistan and showed him goodwill gesture. As far as the formal diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the U.S. were concerned, they developed during the same period, when the U.S. established its embassy at Karachi with Charles William Lewis Jr, as interim in charge of the affairs. Whereas Pakistan established her first embassy in the U.S. on August 28, 1947. When Pakistan got independence, the world was divided into two ideological blocs: Capitalist and Communist, with their sphere of influence in different parts of the world.

The capitalist bloc was dominated by the U.S. and the communist bloc was dominated by the U.S.S.R. Initially, Pakistan tried to stay non-aligned and did not join any of the two blocs. Pakistan needed the economic assistance to build her infrastructure and civil and military institutions. On September 8, 1954, Pakistan signed the (SEATO) South East Asia Treaty Organization. And in February 1955, Turkey and Iraq laid the foundation of Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and Pakistan was convinced by the U.S. to sign the treaty on September 23, 1955. After signing these agreements Pakistan came into a direct alliance with the U.S. There were many ups and downs during different regimes, however overall relationships remained beneficials for the interests of both countries. Due to close relations between the U.S. and India in the 1960's, the relations between Pakistan and the U.S. faded. After that during the last years of 1960's decade Pakistan played an important role in making good relations between China and U.S. and this role

of Pakistan led it again closer to U.S. When Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto came into power, he adopted the policy of Bilateralism towards the U.S. and we saw again some gap in Pak-U.S. relations. The Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan ushered a new era of cooperation, mutual interests and interdependence between Pakistan and the U.S.

The U.S. needed an active strategic partner in the region to counter Soviets and during that time relations between both countries became cordial. Pakistan also started working on a nuclear project and the U.S. was not happy with it. The United States put many sanctions on Pakistan, due to these sanctions, relations between both countries became worse. After a few years when Pervez Musharraf came into power history repeated itself again in September 2001, when the U.S. launched a war against the Taliban government in Afghanistan to hunt Osama Bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Centre. Then Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf was convinced to support the U.S. He joined the U.S as only non-NATO ally in the War on Terror. He provided Pakistan's territory to U.S. military to fight against terrorist, they also used Pakistani airbases. The U.S. also helped Pakistan economically and financially.

Statement of Problem

The purpose of this study is to explore the dynamics of foreign policy making in Pakistan and the assessment of the past decision in the realm of foreign relations, with the special focus on Pak-U.S. relations during the Musharraf regime. The event of 9/11 played a very important role in the history of Pakistan's Foreign policy. Pakistan lost so much in this war of terror than U.S. aid and suffering till now.

Key Questions

1. Did Pakistan had need to give such huge help to U.S. in War on Terror or Pakistan played its role more than its capacity?
2. What were the Pakistan's interests behind the support to U.S. in the War on Terror?
3. What were the factors which forced Musharraf to enter into the war against Terrorism and what were the advantages and disadvantage of this war for Pakistan?

Methodology

Every research needs a proper method to conduct it. The methodology for the thesis would be descriptive as well as analytical. It would look into the possible and available accounts; primary and secondary, to analyze the arguments of a given topic. Sources includes books, documents, journal articles, newspaper articles, and recorded interviews.

Scope and Significance

The present research discusses the overall relations between Pakistan and the United States briefly, however, the focus of this study would be the ear of General Pervez Musharraf. The scope of the present study would concentrate on the reasons and actors responsible and involved which titled Pakistan's policy towards the U.S. from the inception.

Organization of Chapters

Starting from the introduction of the topic, in the first chapter I will discuss the background of history from the Independence Day (1947) to 1965 because Pakistan has a very interesting history of foreign relations with the United States.

In the second chapter of this thesis, I will discuss the Pak-U.S. relations onward to 1965 to 2001, before the event of 9/1. After that in the third chapter of this research I will discuss the relations between both countries in the post 9/11 era from 2001 to 2008 in which Pervez Musharraf also became the President of Pakistan. Last but not least this research will end with conclusion.

Chapter # 1

Relations Between Pakistan and U.S. (1947-1965)

When Pakistan came into being on the map of the world, the Cold war was at its peak and its controversies spoil all the international environment. The world was divided into two main blocs, capitalist and communist. Both tried to expand their ideologies in their surroundings. Initially Pakistan adopted the policy of neutrality and Muhammad Ali Jinnah wanted to maintain good relations with all countries. Communism is not suitable for us, therefore, Pakistan leaned towards the West. On September 7, 1947, a cabinet meeting was held in which Jinnah gave his views: “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. Its [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with two great democratic countries, namely, the U.K and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia”.¹

Pakistan faced a very tough time due to the weak economy and aggressive behavior of India, who did not want to see Pakistan in a stable condition. For that reason, Pakistan needs immediate help and support from a strong country. And only after two weeks of independence Pakistan asked United States for possible aid.² Muhammad Ali Jinnah sent Mir Laik Ali, a former economic advisor to Washington, and there Pakistan’s first ambassador was also present, Jinnah gave assignment to seek loan of \$2 billion for economic stability and for defense purpose.³ On December 17, 1947, the secretary of State Robert Lovett announced the loan of only \$10 Million means only 0.5 percent of requested amount.⁴

¹ Minutes of cabinet discussion, September 9, 1947, 67/CF/47, NDC.

² Embassy Karachi to State Department, September 2, 1947, 845F.00/9-247, DSR, NA.

³ Pakistani Embassy memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard Thorp, November 28, 1947, Pakistan Request for Economic Assistance, SOA Lot File, DSR, NA.

⁴ Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador Mirza Abul Hassan Ispahani, December 17, 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1947*, Vol. 3, 172-174.

The First U.S ambassador to Pakistan

On February 26, 1948, Paul Alling arrived in Karachi with his small staff as the first U.S. ambassador in Pakistan. He was a career diplomat and previous deputy chief of the State department. He was warmly received by the States officials of Pakistan. After few weeks Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his sister Fatima Jinnah invited Alling on tea, at their beach cottage on the Arabian Sea, which was stated few miles far from Karachi. Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Alling had long gathering, discussing different topics during walk on beach. The ambassador of the United States showed hope and interest in good relations between Pakistan and India, Jinnah said that “nothing was nearer to his heart, what he sincerely wished was an association similar to that between the United States and Canada.” He said that “Pakistan desired a defensive understanding with India on a military level . . . with on limit time, similar perhaps to [the U.S.] arrangements with Canada.”⁵

Jinnah wanted his house to become the residence of U.S. ambassador, but Alling responded negatively and disappointed Jinnah and his sister.⁶ After that Jinnah was ill very seriously and died on September 11, 1948. American media did not give a good image towards Pakistan on the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. On Sep 28, 1948, *Time* magazine wrote a story with title “That Man” in which it stated “Out of the travail of 400 million in the Indian subcontinent have come two symbols: a man of love and a man of hate. Last winter the man of non-violence, Gandhi, died at the hands of the assassin. Last week the man of hate, Muhammad Ali Jinnah at 71, died a natural death in Karachi, capital of the state he had founded.”⁷ In general American media coverage spoke

⁵ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), 25.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ *Time*, September 27, 1948, 36-39.

of skepticism about Pakistan's stability. They don't miss any opportunity. On the first anniversary of Pakistan, a *New York Times* editorial stated, "[t]he record of the first year gives promise that . . . the future of India (ultimately a reunited one, we hope) will be better than its past."⁸

Prime Minister of Pakistan First Visit to U.S.

For the first time, a leader from South Asia was invited by the President of America Harry S. Truman in mid-1949. One of the two countries that became independent at same time was not invited. The Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan was disappointed, and his pride was hurt and felt disrespect. On the other hand, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan faced criticism on his relatively moderate approach toward India. People also criticized his pro-Western stance that had produced no significant results on Kashmir issue. Now the ignorance of U.S. for Liaquat and invitation for Jawaharlal Nehru made problem for Liaquat Ali Khan. Therefore, it was very important for him to visit U.S. in any way.⁹

Pakistan received an invitation from the Soviet Union on this action of America.¹⁰ Relations between Karachi and Moscow were not so healthy and neither the two countries had opened embassies therefore, this development was very surprising. Originally this invitation was generated by Raja Ghazanfar Ali who served as ambassador in Iran and had good relations with the Soviet's ambassador. Liaquat Ali Khan had expressed his wish to the Soviet's ambassador that he would like to visit his country and after five days he received an invitation from the Soviet Union.¹¹ This invitation was accepted by Pakistan because Pakistan wanted to tell the America

⁸ "A Year of Independence" (editorial), *New York Times*, August 17, 1948.

⁹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 31.

¹⁰ Hasan Zaheer, *The Times and Trail of Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 227-233.

¹¹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 32.

that it should not take for granted Pakistan. In its reaction, in Karachi the High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith met with Zafarullah Khan and told him that “create doubts in the minds of British and American people without helping Pakistan.”¹² This action of Pakistan put a lot of pressure on America because it did not want Pakistan to visit the Soviet Union therefore, they started thinking about inviting Pakistan. Assistant Secretary McGhee convinced Truman and finally Truman gave approval on November 7, 1949. After that on the first trip to subcontinent McGhee gave invitation to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, and he accepted his invitation.¹³

Search for Aid

At that time Pakistan’s biggest problem was with India. And this new country needed military equipment and industries that could make arms munitions. Because of this constant threat from India, the government of Pakistan had to come up with a huge budget for defense, from the beginning in 1948. In search of arms and equipment, Pakistan looked to Britain for help, because Britain used to provide this equipment to the Indian army from the beginning. The second option was the U.S., which continued to provide equipment in World War II.

The United States clearly replied that it wants London to bear the burden of all these responsibilities regarding South Asia’s security. At that time America was not giving any financial credit or assistance to either Pakistan or India. In March 1948 President of America imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan as fighting continued in Kashmir and then lifted in 1949.¹⁴ An American Lt. Col. Nathaniel Hoskott felt that Pakistan’s airfield could be of use to us, especially against the Soviet Union. He was afraid that the West would not be able to achieve his

¹² British Deputy High Commission Lahore to Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), June 10, 1949, FO 371/76093, PRO.

¹³ George C. McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), 88-93.

¹⁴ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 44.

goals because he repeatedly rejected Karachi's arms requests.¹⁵ On October 18, 1948, the Pakistani embassy declared in its diplomatic notes to the State Department that "The strategic importance of Pakistan from an international point of view cannot be overlooked or treated lightly. In a period of emergency Pakistan can form a base both for military and air operations".¹⁶ Defense Secretary Sikandar Mirza's visit to Washington in 1949 and even the spare parts that Pakistan demanded to get soon were received, it did not make any difference to the situation of Pakistan and America.¹⁷

Middle East Defense

Britain wanted alliance in the Middle East, to prevent the Soviet Union expansion because these areas was politically unstable and militarily weak.¹⁸ The Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) was planned by the British defense planners. According to this plan Egypt was selected as headquarter for military group under Arab members. When Liaquat was told about this plan by the British in January 1951, he said that Pakistan will never participate in MEDO until the Kashmir issue is resolved.¹⁹ British officials told the State Department South Asia director that Kashmir is the main problem until we solve the problem, we cannot bring Pakistan in Western alliance. The United States and Great Britain wanted this alliance to be formed, but Egypt did not accept it. Even after that, the British planner continued to talk about it, but Cairo did not accept it at any price.

U.S. Aid to Pakistan

In May 1953, the secretary of State John Foster Dulles made his first trip to the Middle East and South Asia, visiting Pakistan and India. He stayed in the Arab countries before going to

¹⁵ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 44.

¹⁶ Diplomatic Notes from Pakistan's Embassy to State Department, October 19, 1948, 845F.00/4-2448, DSR, NA.

¹⁷ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 44.

¹⁸ Olaf Caroe, *The Wells of Power*, (London: Macmillan, 1951).

¹⁹ Foreign Office to Embassy Washington, October 13, 1951, FO 371/92875, PRO.

India and still hopes to fulfill the alliance of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). Prime Minister Nehru showed concern about issues with Pakistan and China on the borders and Korean war. He showed neutrality about joining any bloc, but he was afraid that the U.S. would not form any alliance with Pakistan. Dulles said that the United States has no plan to establish a military alliance between Pakistan and the United States, which cannot be discussed with India.²⁰ After that Secretary State came to Karachi, and Pakistani officials welcomed him with great enthusiasm. In a meeting, Ayub Khan told Dulles that “countries that are willing and eager to cooperate with America, it should not hesitate to help them”.²¹ Ayub Khan further said that “if America strengthen Pakistan economically and defensively then India will change its attitude on Kashmir issue”.²²

America was not helping Pakistan because it did not want to offend India. On the other hand, there was a danger to India that America might not form a military alliance with Pakistan. U.S.’s priority was to keep the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and U.S. wanted to help country that would help it against the Soviet Union.²³ It was more beneficial for Pakistan to ally with America.

SEATO

The U.S. was threatened by the extension of the Soviet Union into the Middle East, due to which it was providing military support to Pakistan. South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was the first anticommunist alliance which included Pakistan as well. The purpose of this alliance was to establish a strong defense system against communism because French faced

²⁰ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 54.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Memorandum of May 23, 1953, meeting between Dulles and Gen. Ayub Khan, *Foreign Relations of United States, 1952-54*, Vol. 9, 132-34.

²³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*.

defeat in Indochina, the main characters of this story was Secretary Dulles and British.²⁴ When Pakistan was given the opportunity to join the treaty, the State department was initially skeptical.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State said that no other state of South Asia is becoming a part of it, so why is Pakistan becoming part of it? After some time, the conference for the pact at Manila was organized in which South Asian countries were first invited. The purpose of Pakistan attending this conference at Manila was to protect itself from all sides, not only from communist states. Zafarullah Khan tried hard, but Dulles refused to comply and stated very clearly that this treaty would only protect against communist aggression. Zafarullah Khan signed this treaty without consulting the Pakistani government. When he returned to Pakistan, Gen. Ayub Khan asked him how this SEATO would work for us. He said that it will not be of any use to us, but it will make Americans happy.²⁵ Thus, Pakistan became the member of the SEATO.

Baghdad Pact or CENTO

Iraq and Turkey signed a defense pact in Baghdad on February 24, 1955. The Iraqi government and the British did it together and the U.S. said it would not be a part of this pact and would only monitor it. In Pakistan, Ayub Khan was particularly concerned about whether to join this pact from which the U.S. has excluded itself. The Prime Minister of Turkey Adnan Menderes persuaded Ayub Khan that joining the pact would not affect his country. Even after this, the Pakistani government continued to delay in taking decisions. The U.S. then asked Pakistan to

²⁴ Warren Cohen, Akira Iriye, *The Great Powers in East Asia 1953-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 283-84.

²⁵ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 72.

complete the process of joining the agreement then the cabinet formally accepted it, and Pakistan became the member of CENTO on September 25, 1955.²⁶

The northern tier was geographically complete when Iran joined the Baghdad pact in October 1955 and became the official member. The U.S. said it would build very close political and military ties with the pact, but it will not become its official member.²⁷ The first meeting of this pact was held in Baghdad on November 20, 1955. The U.S. has observed this and sent its ambassador to Iraq, but the U.S. did not fully accept it but plays a very important role in it. Pakistan did not get benefits significantly from participating in these alliances (SEATO and CENTO). Pakistan benefited from this by having regular Pakistani civilians and military officials in contact with members of the United States. The negative side of this was that due to these agreements, Pakistan had to spoil its relations with the Soviet Union. Arab countries and Egypt criticized Pakistan for this because these countries were in favor of neutrality and did not want us to go back to Western imperialism.

Pak-U.S. Relations During Ayub's Regime

Ayub Khan was the first military dictator of Pakistan who gained a lot of fame as the Chief of Army Staff for seven years. He was considered a very competitive administrator and President. He tried his best to handle all matters in a very good way.²⁸ During his reign various commissions were formed which studied major problems and tried to find their solutions, which were known as moderate reform measures.²⁹ After becoming President, Ayub Khan received best wishes from the

²⁶ Farooq Naseem Bajwa, *Pakistan and the West: The First Decade 1947-1957* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan, Vol. 2: 1958-69* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1987).

²⁹ Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 85-93.

U.S. and replied with a thank you letter. America had high expectations from Ayub Khan that he would cooperate with us. The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate published a summed named “*The Outlook for Pakistan*” and in it they said on the performance of Ayub Khan’s first six months “so far, so good”.³⁰ In May 1993, Ayub Khan pleaded with the United States that he wanted F-104s because China, India, and the Soviet Union started using it, therefore we will need it to protect our territory.

Initially, America did not respond well to this and said that we will continue to provide military assistance to Pakistan, but if we give this aircraft to Pakistan, it will start a new arms race between Pakistan and India. U.S. officials said that we are increasing the economic aid of India, yet Pakistan is receiving two or three times more than India.³¹ Despite this, relations were not good, Washington and Karachi were giving a show to the public that both countries have very good relations and strong allies. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history that President Dwight Eisenhower visited Pakistan in December 1959. The U.S. President stayed for three weeks and held many important meetings with officials.

In a meeting with Ayub Khan, the President said that U.S. would exert strong influence on India to resolve the Kashmir issue. Ayub Khan urged that India uses U.S.’s economic aid in its military and that is the main problem because it wants Pakistan to remain weak. Ayub Khan created the system of local councils called “basic democracies”. He moved the capital of Pakistan from Karachi to Islamabad and army headquarter in Rawalpindi.

³⁰ National Intelligence Estimate no. 52-59, “The Outlook for Pakistan,” May 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. 15, 709-11.

³¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-61* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 487.

Relations decline during Kennedy regime

Pakistan was watching the U.S. presidential elections of 1960 very closely and wanted Richard Nixon to become the President. On the other hand, Pakistan was afraid that if Kennedy become the President, it will not be good for Pakistan and U.S. relations because in the past he was not in favor of Pakistan and, he was quite supportive of helping India financially.³² When relations with the U.S. were not going well, Pakistan thought it needed to have good relations with China and the Soviet Union as well. Ayub Khan said that we should not be completely dependent on America. Within the cabinet Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto was in favor of this.

In May 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Pakistan and met with Pakistani officials. The President of Pakistan said that the U.S. which is providing financial support to India and taking advantage of India's bad relations with China, should force India to resolve the Kashmir issue. Johnson replied that the President of Pakistan thinks that we have the capacity to influence Nehru, but I think we do not have.³³ The Vice President of the U.S. directed that they play a role in making Pakistan's military and army more effective and modern. He gave credit to Ayub Khan for wanting to resolve the Kashmir issue and focus on China instead of pitting the Pakistan and India armies against each other.

³² Iqbal Akhund, *Memoir of a Bystander* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

³³ Memorandum of conversation between Vice President Johnson and President Ayub Khan and Advisers, May 20, 1961, FRUS, 1961—63, Vol. 19, 45-50.

Chapter # 2

Pakistan Relation with U.S. during (1965-2001)

On September 6, 1965, the issue of Kashmir became very complicated and turned into an all-out war. India started moving its army towards the border of Punjab to reduce the pressure from Kashmir. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Ayub Khan met with the President Instructor Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy and tell him that India has attacked, and we need U.S. support. Ayub Khan demanded quick action against India under 1956 Pakistan and U.S. bilateral agreement. On 5 September 1965, Bhutto said that Pakistan has good support from all his allies. Bhutto said that in the coming time Pakistan's relations with the whole world will be based on what is their current attitude towards Pakistan.¹

On 8 September 1965, Washington announced that it was cutting off arms supplies to both Pakistan and India. He also said that the U.S. is banning the shipment of arms to Pakistan, in its reply Pakistan showed aggression and urged that peace cannot be established through this. The U.S. did not help Pakistan at all and on the other hand China offered Pakistan that it would help them, and they should continue the war on the Himalayas to build pressure on India, but the President of Pakistan was not ready for that. The Soviet Union played its most important role and tried to convince Pakistan that it would settle down the issue. Pakistan was very surprised that the Soviet Union wanted to come and establish peace in this region, while the U.S. tried its best to stop the communist from coming to this region. On this, U.S. said that we are happy that Russia is solving the issues between both of them, it will not benefit or harm us. If Russia succeeds in bringing peace between them, it will bring more peace in the subcontinent. After that Ayub went

¹ "Ayub Is Said to Support a Shift to Neutralism by Pakistan", *New York Times*, November 22, 1962.

to Washington and there the White House said that they wanted peace to be established between Pakistan and India. When we were giving so much financial support to Pakistan, when the results started coming, Pakistan went into war. Ayub Khan said that all the agreements we made, was of no use in our difficult time.

Bhutto's Relations with U.S.

After the war of 1971, there was again a major turn in foreign policy of Pakistan toward the United States. Due to the fall of Dacca people of Pakistan felt low confidence and a wave of uncertainty in the country. At that time, Bhutto showed his ability and tried to get people out of this state of uncertainty. He introduced very major economic reforms, land reforms, nationalization of different private sectors, and educational reforms. He also worked on giving a new constitution. He wanted to maintain good relations with the rest of the Muslims of Middle East and visited eight countries in a very short period.²

He also visited China and tried to build good relations with it. He was trying to keep Pakistan's foreign policy neutral and maintain good relations with all countries. He maintained good relations with the U.S. and removed the reservations that were against the U.S. in the past.³ He did not have a strict foreign policy for India but showed a soft approach. He also wanted good relations with India and wanted to resolve the Kashmir issue with the table talk. The new constitution was presented, and it transferred Pakistan from Presidential form of government to Parliamentary form of government and on August 12, 1973, Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He visited the U.S. and said Pakistan wanted the embargo lifted, he offered to come to

² S. M. Khan, *Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat* (London Center of Pakistan Studies, 1997), 414-419.

³ C. L. Sulzberger, "Bhutto Wants a Defense Pact with U.S." *New York Times*, February 13, 1972.

Gwadar and build a port which would also be beneficial for you. The Indus River Valley suffered a lot of damage due to floods, which forced Pakistan to import food, for this Nixon's administration agreed to give wheat and aid loan of \$18 million.⁴ The State Department remarks about him that he showed confidence and represented a good image of Pakistan and we consider Pakistan as a responsible friend of the United States.⁵ After all these efforts, the relations between Pakistan and the United States improved somewhat and the U.S. lifted the sanction on Pakistan.

Relations During Zia Era

The relations between Pakistan and the U.S. were not good in the 1970s. Bhutto believed that the United States was making good relations with Pakistan only for its own benefits hence, his policies were considered as anti-American. The U.S. wanted Pakistan to stop its nuclear program, but Bhutto was not accepting it in any case. Due to these reasons, relations between the two countries were getting worse day by day. Pakistan had started a nuclear program with the help of Canada, and its first plant was set up in Karachi. Meanwhile in 1974, India conducted its nuclear weapon test called Smiling Buddha. The U.S. put a lot of pressure on Pakistan and imposed some restrictions on it to stop its nuclear program under this pressure.

Zia made it clear that he will hold elections within 90 days, but he was not able to fulfill his promise. There was a lot of pressure on Zia, both internal and external. After a lot of pressure, Zia said that he will cooperate with the U.S. in some condition. He said we will postpone our nuclear program, but the only condition is that India also stops its nuclear program. But India was

⁴ "Mr. Bhutto's Visit" (editorial), *Washington Post*, September 19, 1963.

⁵ Ibid.

not ready to stop its nuclear program, therefore, Pakistan also continued its program. Due to this, the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. became very bad.

Benazir Bhutto's Foreign Policy towards U.S.

Two main personalities of Pakistan's politics died before the 1988 elections one was President Zia and second was Former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia was followed by his previous Chief Minister of Punjab Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and Bhutto was followed by his daughter Benazir Bhutto, leading his father's political party named Pakistan's People Party (PPP). PPP won the elections of 1988 and Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. According to Armitage, the army said that we will accept Benazir Bhutto as long as she does not interfere in our promotions and the internal affairs of the army. More added, we want that Benazir not to interfere too much in Afghanistan's issue and nuclear program.⁶

When the army of the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, their foreign minister came to Pakistan and asked for help to reduce the political tension in Kabul. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto wanted to do this, but she was under pressure from the President Gulam Ishaq Khan and the ISI Chief.⁷ She tried her best to maintain good relations with America. On October 1, 1990, the U.S. cut off economic and military aid without any notification and also froze the next year's aid. Pakistan was on the third number on taking recipients after Egypt and Israel. Due to the cessation of this aid, Pakistan suffered a major blow. Establishment faced a burden of around \$300 million for buying arms and military expenses therefore, this cessation of aid created difficulties for the

⁶ David Ottaway, "Pakistan May Lose U.S. Aid", *Washington Post*, January 28, 1989.

⁷ Iqbal Akhund, *Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

army. During the Bush's administration, Pakistan's relations with the United States remained very strained.⁸

Nawaz Sharif's Government and U.S.

Nawaz Sharif who had the legacy of Zia and Benazir Bhutto with the legacy of her father had a very tough competition in the elections of 1988. Nawaz had the full support of ISI and many officials.⁹ Benazir was accused of corruption. The result of the elections came, and Nawaz became the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He had more entrepreneurial or pro-business policies than Benazir. He hoped that our relations with Washington would improve, and that our financial and military aid would resume. India had more aircrafts and weapons than Pakistan, So Pakistan wanted to strengthen itself with it. For this, Pakistan had contacted its old friend China to get M-11 missiles from it. China did not listen to the U.S. and provided missiles to Pakistan, on which Washington imposed sanctions on both Pakistan and China.¹⁰

Nawaz fought this election in alliance with all religious parties, so now all his allies are urging to bring a religious system into the constitution of Pakistan. He expressed his opposition to Saddam because the embassy said that Iraq has always been a good friend of India and had never supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. On the other hand, Pakistan has very good relations with Saudi Arabia, and it wanted to keep it like that because Saudi Arabia was a great source of financial support for Pakistan. Pakistan wanted to adopt a policy that would not cause any problem to Americans because Pakistan wanted the Pressler amendment sanctions on it to be lifted.¹¹ Everyone was surprised when the Chief of army staff made a statement against the Nawaz Sharif's

⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 311.

⁹ Barbara Crossette, "Bhutto Foes Win a Strong Majority", *New York Times*, October 26, 1990.

¹⁰ James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

¹¹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000*, 312.

point of view and said that we condemn the U.S. bombing campaign and sympathize with Iraq.¹²
This thing offended the Americans.

Nawaz Out, Benazir In

Nawaz Sharif ruled for just over two years after that he was expelled from the government on charges of corruption. His economic policies were all against Bhutto, he followed the policy of denationalization. But due to his corruption cases, he did not last long in government and the President dismissed his government.¹³ Some things went well because of the caretaker government but the U.S. did not lift Pressler amendment sanctions and M-11 missiles stored in the way.

General elections were held in October 1993, and this time PPP had the majority and successfully created its government and Benazir became the Prime Minister. Benazir stated clearly that it is not possible for Pakistan to stop its nuclear program. It is very important for us to compete with India, the nuclear program is related to the Kashmir issue and this issue will not be solved until a peaceful resolution comes on the Kashmir issue. The U.S. said that if Pakistan wants to lift the sanctions, it will have to stop the nuclear program, only then can Pakistan get F-16 aircrafts. Pakistan was under a lot of pressure from America and the relations between the two countries were bad.¹⁴ His government was thrown out for the second time in corruption cases. She failed to manage the economic problems of the country and performed badly, and Nawaz returned to the Prime Minister's office. Pakistan's major success during this period was that it conducted nuclear tests in 1998.

¹² Barbara Crossette, "In Pakistan, War Stirs Emotions and Politics", *New York Times*, February 1, 1991.

¹³ Mushahid Hussain, "Emerging Political Scenario", *Nation*: Islamabad, April 4, 1993.

¹⁴ Mushahid Hussain, "Army and the Nuclear Issue", *Nation*, April 3, 1994.

Pakistan Relation with U.S. during Musharraf Regime

During the Cold War, relations between Pakistan and America developed. Meanwhile, both the states had their own reservations. The U.S. wanted to prevent the spread of communism of the Soviet Union and Pakistan was threatened by India, which led to friendship between the two countries.¹⁵ Despite this, America was a claimant of democracy and human rights, it recognized the military governments of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia-ul-Haq just to achieve its goals. After the end of the Cold War, the relations between Pakistan and America changed drastically. After this, the main goal of the foreign policy of the United States was that the world should now run in a way that would strengthen the interests of the United States. During the Cold War, the U.S. had some very clear interests in south Asia.¹⁶ The U.S. wanted to establish strong trade relations with India, as far as possible, terrorism can be stopped in Pakistan and Afghanistan, a dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia can be stopped, and the Kashmir issue should be resolved peacefully between Pakistan and India.

It was October 12, 1999, Pervez Musharraf's plane was stopped from landing in Pakistan. This was an airbus and carried 198 passengers. Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister, and he continued these instructions. The pilot of the plane was instructed not to land in Pakistan and to land the plane wherever he wanted from outside of Pakistan.¹⁷ Nawaz Sharif removed Musharraf from the post of Chief of Army Staff and Lieutenant General Ziauddin was made new Chief of Army Staff. Musharraf ordered his office holders that martial law be imposed in the country.¹⁸

¹⁵ S. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A reappraisal* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000).

¹⁶ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 120.

Musharraf met the President of the country on 13 October 1999, Muhammad Rafiq Tarar, so that he could legalize his coup. People were thinking there would be democratic government, but Musharraf imposed an emergency in the country, repealed the constitutions and took the power of the Chief Executive himself.¹⁹ He addressed the people and formed a seven-member cabinet to run the country. He appointed three retired military officers and a judge as provincial administrator. He had not yet made himself the Prime Minister and the office of the Prime Minister was empty, and all the staff had been dismissed. There were no active protests in the country against this move, but internationally Pakistan was criticized a lot.

As a result, Pakistan was expelled from the Commonwealth of Nations. After that Musharraf made his first foreign visit to Saudi Arabia and there he met with the King of Saudi Arabia and other officials, after which he left for Madinah and then performed Umrah. A few days later, Musharraf reshuffled his cabinet and inducted many technocrats and bureaucrats in it.²⁰ In December, Musharraf faced international criticism when an Indian airline was hijacked, and India blamed on Pakistan. The President of the U.S. told Musharraf that the organization in Pakistan that played a role in the hijacking of this plane should be banned. But Pakistani officials refused it because of the fear of religious political parties in Pakistan.

After Musharraf became a martial law administrator, he made a good image of Pakistan in front of the whole world. He tried to build good relations with India, but India was not happy with the military rule in Pakistan because India believed that Pervez Musharraf was behind the Kargil war. India also believed that terrorism across the border was from Pakistan, that is why India refused to come in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting.²¹

¹⁹ Abid Ullah Jan, *The Musharraf Factor* (Lahore: Jamhoori Publications, 2006).

²⁰ Stephen P Cohen, *Future of Pakistan* (Washington: Brooking Institute Press, 2011).

²¹ Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2009).

Due to this behavior of India, relations between Pakistan and India became more complicated. In 2000, Pakistan tried very hard to somehow solve the issue by sitting with India, but it was not ready for this.

In 2001, when the earthquake hit Gujarat and Kutch in India, Musharraf made a call to India and showed sympathy. Pakistan was trying everything possible to somehow convince India to talk. After Pakistan's efforts, Musharraf received an invitation from India for summit level talk and Musharraf accepted it. The two countries met in the city of Agra and held four major meetings in which India asked Pakistan to stop terrorism on the border and Pakistan asked India to resolve the Kashmir issue, but this meeting did not reach any results and failed.²²

It was important for Pakistan to dispel U.S. suspicions as Pakistan had been receiving financial and military assistance from the U.S. and its allies for a long time. The Pakistani Army responded well to America's reservations that it was all pre-planned. Pakistan army took its position that the civilian government had revolted against the army and our reaction was a counter-coup.²³ But American intelligence was giving different answers as to why the regime changed inside Pakistan. The first thing was that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wanted to keep as much power in his hands as possible. He intervened in the affairs of the army and removed Pervez Musharraf from the post of Chief of Army Staff due to which the regime changed in the country. The second reason was that Musharraf was considered the mastermind of the Kargil War, that Musharraf raised the Kashmir issue at the international level by conducting an operation in Kargil, with the help of different organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam.²⁴

²² M. I. Fani, *US-Pakistan Relations After 9/11: Options and Compulsion* (Lahore: University of Punjab, 2004).

²³ Z. Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan and Struggle with Militant Islam* (Islamabad: Vanguard Books (Pvt). Lt, 2007).

²⁴ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017).

America's main concern before Pervez Musharraf came to power was nuclear non-proliferation and political stability of this region because of ongoing race between Pakistan and India. As for whether the Americans would help Musharraf's government further, they helped him because Musharraf helped America in the war on terror. As soon as Pervez Musharraf took over the government and ordered that all the judges re-swear their oaths of offices according to Oath of Judges order no 2000.²⁵ Rafiq Tarar the President of Pakistan, resigned from his post and Pervez Musharraf became the President and the Supreme Court ordered Pervez Musharraf to conduct elections in 2002.

²⁵ Cohen, *Future of Pakistan*, 2011.

Chapter # 3

Pakistan U.S. Relations After 9/11 (2001-2008)

The most controversial decision of Musharraf's regime was that Pakistan was becoming a frontline state as an ally of United States in the war on terror. This alliance meant that Pakistan aligned itself with the counter-terrorism policy at every level. It changed the whole structure of Pakistan's foreign policy. The question is why and how Musharraf's government made this offer to the U.S. for cooperation at any level. What was the effect of this alliance of the internal and external matters and security of Pakistan? All these things will be discussed in this chapter.

If we analyze the literature, Musharraf's decision to become ally with the U.S. in the war on terror can be viewed in two different ways. The government has taken its stand that we have taken this rational and realistic decision because as a result of changes in the global political environment.¹ The critical opinion given on this decision is that, this decision was for personal gain, and the interest of the country was not taken into consideration. But as in reality there is a lie somewhere in every statement. There was a lot of pressure on Islamabad after the 9/11 attacks, as a result of which the Musharraf government took this decision.

Pakistan was facing a lot of pressures, threatening statements were coming from the U.S., while on the other hand, Pakistan was afraid that India would not play its role in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan needed to adopt very rational and calculated policy, keeping in mind the importance of its geographical location, regarding the war on terror. America's attitude can be gauged from what the U.S. Secretary of State said to Pakistan's ISI chief that "Either you are 100%

¹ Shabana Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism: A case study of Musharraf Regime* (Lahore, Vanguard Books, 2020), 107.

with us or you are 100% against us, there is no grey area.”² Pakistan’s envoy Maleeha Lodhi in America conveyed Washington’s message to Islamabad and Pervez Musharraf said, tell America that it will get what it wants.³ Even after some years, Pervez Musharraf said that it was quite easy for me to decide. Actually, this work is done by the government, but at that time I had many positions, Chief of Army Staff, President, and Chief Executive. I had authority over all institutions, military, and civilian officials, and all well-known people of the field, with whom I consulted, and we took the best decision in the interest of the country.⁴

On the other hand, Islamabad’s decision about the Taliban government in Afghanistan was not wise. A very close retired army colleague of Musharraf also said that this decision was an individual decision by the Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf, who remarked that this decision was taken very quickly and then contact with favorite political advisors, corps commanders and with the members of National Security Council, while doing all this, Musharraf left out the complexity of the problem. Musharraf should have set a limit to help America.⁵

US’s Demands from Pakistan

America put some conditions in front of Pakistan, on which it said that there will be no discussion on them, it will have to be accepted by Pakistan in any race and Musharraf readily accepted these conditions.

- Pakistan banned Al-Qaeda people from Afghanistan, stopped all arms going there and the Pakistan government should end all support to Osama Bin Laden.

² Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan; Eye of the storm* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 2.

³ Fayyaz, *Pakistan’s Response toward Terrorism*, 107.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

- Pakistan should allow U.S. aircrafts to fly over its border and land there.
- Pakistan should allow us to use all its naval and air bases and also share intelligence information with us.
- We need information about immigration and access to the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Pakistan should strongly resist the attacks on America and stop all those elements who support terrorism in the country.
- Ban oil supply to the Taliban regime and stop those who travel from Pakistan to Afghanistan to join the Taliban group.
- All evidence testify that Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda network are present in Afghanistan and Pakistan should end all diplomatic relations with the Taliban government, stop supporting them, and should help the U.S. and eliminate Osama and his network as per the following instructions.⁶

Why to Help the U.S.?

On September 19, 2001, Pervez Musharraf addressed the nation and said that for these reasons, I will continue to help the United States without restraint.

- It is necessary to secure the strategic assets of Pakistan.
- To protect the Kashmir issue.
- To save Pakistan from being called a terrorist country.

⁶ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism* (New York, M. E. Sharp, Inc, 2005), 217.

- To prevent the formation of anti-Pakistan government in Kabul, and this is necessary to make Pakistan a politically dignified nation.⁷

Due to this decision Pakistan's decades-long security policy has suddenly changed with regards to Afghanistan. Pakistan redefined its strategic priorities and at same time faced many internal problems. This decision also made the Taliban government in Afghanistan a strategic liability for Pakistan after 9/11. Syed Rifaat Hussain says on this that the purpose of this change was that Pakistan should leave the right wing and come out of it, avoid America's revenge, it was also necessary to prevent an Indo-American alliance from forming for Pakistan's security, Pakistan was seeing its own benefit from it, all sanctions were lifted from Pakistan, the relations between Pakistan and America started to improve again, it was also important to prove that our military government was better for the country, and most importantly, Pakistan had to create its own political and social space in the international politics to avoid the effects of deteriorating situation in Afghanistan on Pakistan's society.⁸

Policy Shift

The important thing here is that Islamabad changed its earlier stance on supporting the Taliban but in its National Security Strategy, India was still called a major threat to Pakistan. In fact, the reason for this entire policy change was attributed to the threat from India. Because Pakistan was told internally that now India has offered to give its airfields to America.⁹ Due to which Pakistan has increased the risk that the U.S. will get closer to India and make its place in

⁷ Ahmed Farooqi, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan* (UK, Ash gate Publishing Ltd, 2003), 18-19.

⁸ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 109.

⁹ "India offers Three Air Bases for US Aircrafts", *People's Daily*, September 19, 2001.

Afghanistan. However, there was no significant change in Pervez Musharraf's strategic calculations.

A security aide of Musharraf said that India's offer was so that Pakistan could not take advantage of India's default, establishing ground forces in India could have been a challenge, however the border between India and Afghanistan does not meet, India will have to take the aerial route to land its troops in Pakistan.¹⁰ Musharraf's pro-U.S. policy in Afghanistan can be seen as a good way for Musharraf to solve Pakistan's pre-9/11 problems. To manage Pakistan's declining economy and to restore diplomatic relations and to reduce the wave of political crises in Pakistan this policy can be said to be right. This decision was propagated as such that it was a strategic necessity for Pakistan to make a moderate state in front of the whole world. Pakistan has benefited greatly by joining the international coalition against terrorism.

Pakistan was able to lift sanctions and restore international relations and its economic condition began to improve. The relations between Pakistan and America have once again reached a very high level and restrictions on Pakistan began to be removed. On 22 September 2001, President George W. Bush ordered and issued a notification to lift economic sanctions on Pakistan which were imposed after the nuclear tests. On 27 October 2001, the President issued another order under which all democracy related sanctions were lifted from Pakistan. Soon after this, Pakistan entered into loan agreements with Paris Club and Western countries. After all these restrictions were removed, Pakistan was allowed to receive \$600 million from the United States in the form of Economic Support Fund in 2002.¹¹

¹⁰ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 110.

¹¹ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017).

Secure Pakistan's Strategic Assets

Pakistan had set many goals in face of many of its problems internally and externally. With this decision of Musharraf to become an ally of America, Pakistan will have to change its national strategy on nuclear safety, Kashmir issue and Afghanistan. Musharraf said that this decision of mine was very important to protect Pakistan's strategic assets. He said if I had not taken this decision, it would have given America an opportunity to destroy these assets, and India would love to help America in any way possible.¹² The president ordered that Pakistan's nuclear assets be redeployed to the at least six new secret places.¹³ The government of Pakistan was threatened that if Pakistan did not help the U.S. in the war with the Taliban, it was possible that the U.S. would attack Pakistan's nuclear assets.¹⁴ Was there really any threat to Pakistan's strategic assets or was it justification of this decision in this critical situation? Security analysts said that India could have capitalized on this opportunity.

India's willingness to participate in the war against terrorism have been dangerous for Pakistan. At the same time, when Musharraf feared that Pakistan's strategic assets could be threatened, it would create an atmosphere of uncertainty in the country. Dr. Naeem Salik said that with this policy of Musharraf, the international community showed a lot of doubt and criticism on Pakistan's nuclear assets.¹⁵ This was not a good argument and raised questions about the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets. This allowed the U.S. media to continuously attack Pakistan's nuclear weapon issue and it was stated that it was under threat from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Musharraf's

¹² Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

¹³ Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, "Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons – Musharraf Says Arsenal is Now Secure", *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2001.

¹⁴ Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security issues*, (Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2010), 10-15.

¹⁵ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 112.

argument was probably intended to take advantage of the Pakistani people's emotions about their nuclear assets, so that Pakistan can help U.S. and to join GWOT (Global War on Terror).¹⁶

Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation

There is no doubt that at the international level, the United States continued to express doubts about the protection of Pakistan's strategic assets. It is because of Pakistan's nuclear assets that relations between Pakistan and the U.S. have been strained for decades.¹⁷ Western media regularly reported Al-Qaeda arm purchased, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and attributed Pakistan as the source. The U.S. blamed Pakistan when it got evidence of this from Afghanistan. That is why the U.S. announced to help Pakistan protect its nuclear assets immediately after 9/11. Concerns about Pakistan's nuclear security increased when the A.Q. Khan scandal spread to the public.¹⁸ The United States said that Pakistani nationals were responsible for the spread of nuclear weapons designs to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.

Pakistan started a formal investigation on this incident and started investigating of all scientists individually. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the hero of Pakistan, accepted this charge. Explaining this, he said that there will be no rollback on Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs.¹⁹ Pervez Musharraf said that A.Q. Khan has done this act of personal corruption and Pakistan's government has done nothing to do it. Pakistan nuclear security insured that a comprehensive code of conduct has been drawn up for the protection of Pakistan's nuclear assets, which allow to block the coordination between terrorists elements and foreign elements in Pakistan.

¹⁶ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 113.

¹⁷ Brig (ret'd) Feroz Hassan Khan, *Global Terrorism: Genius, Implications, remedial, and Countermeasures* (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2001).

¹⁸ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 112.

¹⁹ President Musharraf quoted in, *Pakistan Times*, February 6, 2004.

Pakistan's nuclear safety history begins in the 1950s and has always played its full role against nuclear non-proliferation, especially in keeping with the rules of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). Pervez Musharraf's stance on national security policy and giving top priority to the issue of Kashmir and nuclear weapon, he wanted to achieve two goals, a) suppressing those who are against their government in the country, b) stopping the U.S. and other institutions from interfering in Pakistan, but due to the changing circumstances, all the goals turned into challenges. The issue of Kashmir plays an important role in the national security of Pakistan and Pakistan has been working on it since 1947.

Kashmir Case

All the governments in Pakistan since the beginning have used the Kashmir issue to build national unity and support for Pakistan at the domestic and global level. Musharraf observed that the rightful struggle of the people and the struggle for freedom from colonial or foreign occupation cannot be called terrorism. Pakistan has changed its narrative on Afghanistan for the sake of Kashmir. Pakistan said that India is committing state terrorism on Kashmir. Pakistan has termed the support of Kashmiris as Jihad-i-Hurriyat, which will create contradiction and confusion among people by mixing Al-Qaeda and terrorist groups.

Musharraf said while giving an interview to *The Washington Post* in 2002, highlighting various problems of Pakistan and said, there are three main elements of terrorism in Pakistan, first Al-Qaeda, second is our neighboring country which is oppressing the innocent people of Kashmir, thirdly sectarianism within Pakistan (Sunni and Shia) extremism. The third element is more dangerous to us and sadly the world does not care about it. Whereas we worry a lot about it because

it is destabilizing internally.²⁰ Relations between Pakistan and India worsened when the Jumma and Kashmir State Assembly was attacked in October 2001 and after some time the Indian Parliament was also attacked in New Delhi. India blamed Pakistan for these attacks and the relations became very strained.

America played its role in all this worsening situation because if the situation between Pakistan and India were to turn into a war situation, then Pakistan would have to send its army from the border of Afghanistan, which America did not want, therefore the U.S. played a role in reducing the tension between both countries. During this tension all air and land links with India were closed, and all economic activities were stopped. Risks grew with war between both countries and because of pressure from America, Pervez Musharraf gave a speech in which he said that all the extremists in the country will now be taken in strict hands. He declared; Pakistan has been facing sectarian terrorism for many years. Now is the time of reckoning. Today there is no external threat to Pakistan. but the real threat to Pakistan is from within. I request that all of us should not interfere in each other's affairs.²¹

In this speech, internal terrorism was described as a threat to Pakistan and a hindrance in relations with India, Afghanistan, and America. Pervez Musharraf announced some measures, students of all madrasas and foreign students register themselves with the government of Pakistan within two months. It was directed to complete the trial of the perpetrators of terrorism as soon as possible and many organizations were banned within Pakistan. Immediately after this announcement, leaders of all these organizations were arrested and closed their head offices. When

²⁰ General Musharraf's interview, *The Washington Post*, March 28, 2002.

²¹ Quoted in Rizwan Zeb, "US interest in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan", *Margalla Papers 2004* (Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004), 73-89.

the leaders of these organizations were released, they not only came to the public, but they also began to convince people for Jihad.

Musharraf's Kashmir policy did not go to extremes, but he remained moderate. He went out of box many times and proposed on the issue of Kashmir.²² Musharraf presented a four-point formula on which he said that we should relax a little on the border, the army should be removed from different points, a government of its own should be set up, and both sides should have joint supervision.²³ Due to this offer of Pervez Musharraf, a lot of improvement in the affairs of Kashmir was expected but no good response was given by India. Within the country, Musharraf faced various reactions to his policy on Kashmir. Pakistan's religiopolitical party Jamaat-e-Islami made him a one-man show, saying that this is a rollback of Pakistan's principled stand. Other religious and political parties also gave a similar reaction, they said that Musharraf's policy is to temporarily cool down the Kashmir issue, the only solution is Jihad.

Pakistani analysts said that Musharraf knew that Kashmir was a problem that could not be solved by force, therefore, he continued back door diplomacy and tried his best to resolve the Kashmir issue. Pakistan's foreign minister said in 2001 that both Pakistan and India had come close on the Kashmir issue. He said, at that time there was no partition of Kashmir between Pakistan and India, creation of soft border on the line of control, parts of Kashmir in Pakistan and India should there establish self-government, and a non-military approach should be adopted to prevent cross-border terrorist activities.²⁴

²² Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 122.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Quoted in, Dr. Syed Rifat Hussain, "Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir", *South Asian Survey*, 2007, 95.

Pakistan as a Frontline State in War on Terror

Pakistan fully supported America in the war against terrorism and fought this war as a frontline state. Musharraf's decision to support the U.S. military in 2001 marked a turning point in the decades-long relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Islamabad allowed the U.S. to use its land routes under this agreement, shared intelligence information, and together they took actions against terrorism. This important role of Pakistan was criticized within the country. Head of Central Command said in Islamabad that no country has fought with Al-Qaeda more directly than Pakistan as an ally of the United States.²⁵ Director General ISPR, Major General Shaukat Sultan said that Pakistan joined the international coalition against terrorism and this decision was taken by Pakistan in its national interest, so that the society can be saved from extremism. Ever since this war started, Pakistan has paid a heavy price and the political, economic, and security threats to Pakistan have increased enormously. No country has been affected more by the Global War on Terror (GWOT) than Pakistan.²⁶

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. alliance with Pakistan and the conditions it has set include the use of air routes, land routes, and sharing of intelligence information and joint operations against Al-Qaeda and it was directed to Pakistan to cut off all diplomatic relations with Taliban. Musharraf's government accepted all these demands without hesitation. Pakistan's high military command while explaining all this strategy said, to achieve the objective of eliminating terrorism, to prevent our territory from using for terrorism, Pakistan is conducting military operations within its borders and on the Pak-Afghan border, the aim of our operations is to stop terrorism from inside

²⁵ Quoted in, Ron Laurenzo. "Abizaid Pakistan Best ally in War on Terror", *Defense week*, February 2, 2004.

²⁶ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 136.

Pakistan and from outside, to bring peace within the country. All these operations aimed at effectively sealing the border so that cross border movement can be checked.²⁷

Provision of Air Bases to the U.S.

Pakistan provided aerial and radar and ground support to the U.S. for operations in Afghanistan, but the Pakistani government's statements differ from the actual events. But Pervez Musharraf burned this public perception and said that Pakistan is not giving any such landing rights, naval outposts, and air bases to America.²⁸ Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistani ambassador to the U.S. agreed with this and said that Pakistan's corridor was discussed but it was agreed that there would be no combat operations in Afghanistan from our soil. It is a common miscomputation among people that Pakistan has not protected its national interest. The Federal Secretary of Defense said that Pakistan has given four airports to help the U.S. army, three of these airports are still on standby for emergencies.²⁹

U.S. wants Intelligence Information and Joint Anti-Terrorist Cooperation

Pakistan shared Al-Qaeda and Taliban intelligence information with the U.S. officials. Both countries have jointly conducted operations against Al-Qaeda inside Pakistan. In Pakistan, the United States, with the help of its security experts, captured Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban and carried out various operations here, which was acknowledged by Pakistan. In 2004, Pakistan conducted forty-four military operations having 6000-7000 troops, with the help of which 600 terrorists were killed. The ISPR said Pakistan deployed around 140,000 troops who tried to take

²⁷ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 136.

²⁸ Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, 204-205.

²⁹ "3 Airports for Standby for US: Secretary", *Daily Times*, July 19, 2006.

the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives under U.S. supervision and mostly were captured from the Afghanistan and Iran border, where we established 321 military check posts.

In 2002, Pakistan and the United States developed a strategy to deal with terrorism and law enforcement. In this conversation, the most serious issues like terrorism, drug smuggling, and trade of humans were main concerned. Along with this, law and police reforms were emphasized. The release of Pakistani prisoners in America was also discussed. Pakistan and the United State have tried to track down Al-Qaeda elements using advanced equipment, including satellite phones. The U.S. trained Pakistani intelligence personnel and modernized equipment that Pakistan used to track the internet traffic. In 2001, the U.S. FBI was deployed at Karachi airport to monitor all arrivals and departures. With the cooperation of both countries, the operator of Al-Qaeda Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, was arrested in Pakistan. After his arrest, it was found that he had kept information about many attacks inside the U.K. and U.S., if he had not been arrested, surely these attacked would have happened.³⁰

Pakistan's Support to NATO

From the beginning, NATO needed Pakistan, ever since the U.S. came to Afghanistan. NATO could not have done anything in Afghanistan without Pakistan's logistical support. It had to take many services from Pakistan to keep its supply line in working, which included storage management, transfer of good from one place to another, health management and many other services. NATO supplies used to go to Afghanistan via Pakistan through which they crossed the Khyber Pass, capital of KP. This was a very used and old route to connect Afghanistan, in the past it was used to support Mujahideen who were fighting against the Soviet Union.³¹ All these goods

³⁰ Bright M., "Suspect arrested in Pakistan may hold Al-Qaeda's secrets", *The Observer*, 8 August 2004.

³¹ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 140.

used to go through the Khyber agency route in FATA to the soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. First, this supply reaches the port of Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan, this supply then enters Afghanistan via Peshawar and then reaches Kabul through the western route. All remaining supplies come through the Chaman border in Balochistan.³²

After the 9/11 incident, Pakistan actively participated in the fight against terrorism along with the entire international community. Pakistan took a very important responsibility in this war. From the Arabian Sea to the Pak-Afghan border, Pakistan had the responsibility to be a facilitator all along the way. NATO forces in Afghanistan received intelligence service from Pakistan. After all, Pakistan has left no stone unturned to support and help the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan. Pakistan tried its best to fulfill its responsibility as a supporter of the U.S. and ensuring the security of NATO aid transiting through Pakistan was among its priorities. Musharraf was in threat that the aid to the American army would not be attacked by the restive tribes on the way, so he adopted a policy of pressure and reconciliation with the tribes.

Then what was feared happened, in early 2008 various militants in Pakistan began attacking NATO convoys and their supply line. The Kohat Tunnel was captured by the militant, after which the Pakistani army recaptured it from them after a fierce battle. This situation put the Pakistan army in trouble. Again in 2009, these militants destroyed more than twenty-five oil trucks and hijacked dozens of trucks with goods. After all this situation, Pakistan gave permission to America, and it conducted a military operation in FATA. This action of the militants can also be seen as a response to the ongoing U.S. attacks in Waziristan. But Pakistan officially continued the operation because the operation was essentially necessary to protect NATO vehicles but after only

³² Walter Pincus, "U.S. Seeks New Supply Routes into Afghanistan", *Washington Post*, November 19, 2006.

two months, the supply line was reopened through the Khyber Agency. The surprising thing was that behind all these incidents there was a connection with Afghanistan. This threatened the internal and external security of Pakistan due to which the war from Afghanistan would enter the border areas of Pakistan.

Because Pakistan was an ally of the U.S., the threat to NATO supply lines was affecting Pakistan's politics as well. All this situation was very complicated for Pakistan. Former Governor of KPK Awais Ahmad Ghani said that Pakistan's participation in the war on terrorism and alliance with the United States is based on the fact that the sentiments of the people of Pakistan are connected with it. Pakistan cannot continue this war if the people of Pakistan stop supporting it.

Capturing Al-Qaeda terrorists

If we look at all the past records of Pakistan, how many security operations Pakistan have conducted to arrest or kill people of Al-Qaeda, we see both some successes and failures as a result. Major General Shaukat Sultan, the spokesperson of Pervez Musharraf of that time said that Pakistan has continuously helped America with its best efforts. Pakistan deployed more than seventy thousand Pakistani soldiers in the border areas, with the help of which more than 700 Al-Qaeda members were killed. Our aim is to secure the western borders for which we have moved the security forces to the tribal areas.³³ It is necessary to take this step so that the ongoing war in Afghanistan does not affect millions of Pakistanis. The arrests of all major Al-Qaeda leaders from different cities of Pakistan testify to the strong presence of Al-Qaeda's followers in Pakistan. For example, Abu Zubaida, an Al-Qaeda leader, was captured from a safe house in Faisalabad in 2002. In 2003, Abu Umar and Abu Hamza were arrested from Karachi. Al-Qaeda's third major leader

³³ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 143.

Khalid Sheikh Muhammad was arrested from a house of a member of Jamaat-e-Islami in 2003.³⁴ More than one thousand Al-Qaeda members were killed in the operations carried out by Pakistan. Pakistan sent one lac soldiers to Tora Bora for search operations and to find the Al-Qaeda's fugitives around Pakistan's border.³⁵ In 2003, Pakistan handed over 443 members of different nationalities to the U.S.³⁶

The question arises as to why Pakistan handed over Pakistani militants and Al-Qaeda operatives to the U.S., Pakistan Should returned all these people to their own country. Pakistani officials said that it is a misconception that Pakistan sent all these people to the U.S. without their country's permission. Pakistan's intelligence officer said that we had terrorists from 39 different countries, we connected them in their countries, but most of the countries refused to take them back. We did not have the facility and authority to investigate them, so we thought it better to hand them over to America, especially the members of Al-Qaeda.³⁷

Along with this, Pakistan banned all Al-Qaeda linked organizations within Pakistan. Bank accounts of organizations suspected by Pakistani authorities of being linked to and facilitating Al-Qaeda were frozen. In which these organizations were included, Al Rasheed Trust, Al Rabeta Trust, and Al Akhtar Trust. All these organizations were judged by Pakistani courts, closed down their accounts, and all their assets were seized by the government. Even after that, Pakistan's intelligence agencies kept receiving information that Al-Qaeda had opened various organizations in the country under different identities from which they collected money. Al-Qaeda influence had grown to such an extent that Pakistan's internal and external security concerns had grown

³⁴ Z. Hussain, "Closing in", *Newsline* (Karachi) March 2003.

³⁵ "Pakistan deployed over 100,000 troops", *Dawn*, August 2, 2002.

³⁶ Qudssia Akhlaque, "443 Al-Qaeda suspects handed over to the US", *Dawn*, January 6, 2003.

³⁷ Fayyaz, *Pakistan's Response toward Terrorism*, 145.

enormously. Pakistan's military operations inside FATA exposed Al-Qaeda political and ideological ties with outsiders. Al-Qaeda and its allied militants emerged in Pakistan over time and posed a major threat to Pakistan. Brig (ret'd) Mahmud Shah said AL-Qaeda's original goal was to capture Islamabad, Central Asia and Kabul. There is no doubt that Al-Qaeda was a huge internal threat for us and unfortunately, we had no policy in place to deal with that problem effectively. Musharraf's policy was also confused, there is absolutely no political acumen to understand the complexity of the problem.

Conclusion

Pakistan has had the longest and toughest relationship with the United States within this region. There were many ups and downs in it. Since 1947, when relations between Pakistan and America were established, there has been a lot of fluctuation in the relations of both countries. National interest determines the quality of relations. America's relationship with Pakistan had some important points. The U.S. was looking at its own interest in this relationship and Pakistan was interested in its own interest. But some U.S. interests were quite obvious, like, the U.S. wanted to strengthen its authority in South Asia to prevent new powers rising in this region particularly China with communism. When Pakistan became independent and relations with the United States just began, the U.S. was most at risk of the spread of communism in South Asia, that is why the U.S. needed to have its forces in South Asia to stop communism. Pakistan was also looking for a powerful ally to help it stand strong against India, and on the Kashmir issue, Pakistan needed a good supporter, therefore the relations between these two countries became closer.

Apart from this, Pakistan also needed economic help because Pakistan was at war with India. The U.S. always failed to resolve the issue of Kashmir; we can say that the U.S. has never wanted to solve this problem with good intentions. America cheated Pakistan many times, but Pakistan had to turn to the U.S. again due to different circumstances. Things got worse when Pakistan tried to become a nuclear power. Because of this move, the U.S. put a lot of restrictions on Pakistan. Pakistan was cut off from financial aid, diplomatically isolated and banned from buying arms. After the events of 9/11, the relations between Pakistan and the U.S. improved a lot once again. Pakistan, under the pressure of the U.S. and some of its own free will, decided to become an ally in the war of terror.

In this war, Pakistan supported America in every way with an open heart. The U.S. took full advantage of Pakistan in this war and made decisions of its own from Pakistan. The U.S. used Pakistan's territory, air boundaries, intelligence sources and military resources freely. In return, Pakistan received financial assistance from the U.S. But the financial help that Pakistan got from America was very less compared to the loss that Pakistan suffered for the next decades. During this entire war, 70 thousand soldiers of Pakistan were martyred. Economically, Pakistan has gone down a lot and the image of Pakistan has been damaged in front of the whole world. No country in the world was ready to invest in Pakistan. becoming an ally of the U.S. and acting as a front-line state as U.S. ally in Global War on Terror (GWOT) cost Pakistan dearly. But there is no doubt that Pakistan will benefit from this alliance. Now Pakistan should learn from the mistakes of the past and determine the future from this experience. In the present era, no one is an enemy or a friend, the foreign policy of all countries depends on their national interests.

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