

An Inquiry into the Causes of the Fall of Ayub Khan

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Abstract

General Ayub Khan usurped power in October 1958 and declared himself as the Chief Martial Law Administrator by ousting the then president, Iskandar Mirza. He ruled the country for about eleven years before resigning from the post and surrendering power to the then Commander in Chief of Army, Yehya Khan. The fall of Ayub Khan was the result of many problems that intruded on Pakistani politics and society. The political alliances formed during the era were giving tough times to Ayub which were equally supported by anti-Ayub movements by the urban middle class, students, lawyers, laborers, and teachers. In such circumstances, it was hard for Ayub to continue and lastly surrendered power to Yehya Khan. This study covers an overview of the first military regime in Pakistan. This study aims to discuss the fall of Ayub Khan, its causes, and its consequences. The study is qualitative and is based on secondary data. The research shows that the causes of the downfall of Ayub Khan were mostly political. Strong opposition from both parts of Pakistan forced Ayub Khan to hand over the control to Yahya Khan. The consequences of Ayub's fall were good for that time because it brought about the restoration of parliamentary democracy and universal adult franchise. However, Yahya Khan's short era led to many disasters. The economic growth came to a very low point. The regional differences vastly increased after the 1970 Election. The problem of transfer of power led to severe army actions in East Pakistan.

Keywords: General Ayub Khan, Dictatorship, Pak-India War of 1965, Basic Democracy, EBDO

1. Historical Background:

Ayub Khan's regime started in October 1958 after the 1956 constitution was abrogated and martial law was imposed. General Ayub Khan came to power through a military takeover. The main aim, for the time being, was said to control the crises going on in the country but later it proved that the main reason was coming to power. Ayub Khan for most of his reign wasn't concerned with anything except holding his power. He cleared his path by banning the political parties and replacing the parliamentary system with a presidential form of government. It was the

first time Pakistan had a dictator as a ruler. The political instability was at its peak in those starting years of Pakistan. The military regime happened to stabilize the situation but it turned out the other way. Everything Ayub did was to protect his chair as president and he succeeded to do that for many years. However, the Indo-Pak war in 1965, the presidential election in 1965, and the Tashkent agreement changed everything. The war led to economic sanctions. The presidential elections were on the Basic Democracies system. The opposition accused Ayub of rigging the election and the BD system came under serious criticism. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto exposed the Tashkent agreement, formed the Pakistan People's Party, and expressed strong opposition to Ayub's regime.

The popularity of PPP in West Pakistan and the Awami League in East Pakistan was bringing troubles to the stability of the regime. Asghar Khan's movement and a few other political alliances were creating hurdles for a stable Ayub government. Finally, the movement against his government intensified towards the end of 1968. Anti Ayub movement was launched by the urban middle class i.e. students, lawyers, teachers, doctors, laborers, politicians, etc. It became quite difficult for General Ayub to tackle so much opposition from politicians as well as common people from all walks of life. He ultimately decided to resign in March 1969. In his last radio address to the nation on 25 March 1969, he said, "I cannot preside over the destruction of my country". This ended a rather stable and progressive era in the history of Pakistan.

Ayub Khan replaced the parliamentary form of government with a presidential one in the 1962 constitution. This move further strengthened the position of the president and gave him more legal powers than the constitution of 1956. He kept the major powers in his own hands and just used the Basic Democracies for presidential elections. Ayub Khan made full use of all these powers in the first few years of his rule. At the end of 1965, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto left and started exposing Ayub's policies. Ayub Khan couldn't hold on to all the powers and had no strong support anymore and at last, relinquished the power.

Ayub Khan's era is still regarded as the best in Pakistan. Economic development, industrial development, mega projects, land reforms, and Muslim family law ordinance were revolutionary. But Ayub concentrated maximum powers in his hands. He disqualified the political parties through an ordinance on charges of corruption. The economic disparity was at its

peak. The common people never got the fruits of the developments Ayub made. All these problems led to the Fall of Ayub Khan. This study is an attempt to identify the major causes of his downfall and the major consequences his regime made on the polity of Pakistan. The research is based on secondary sources of data. The study materials are taken from newspapers, articles, journals, books, past research, published reports, and the internet.

2. Causes of the Fall of Ayub Khan

Scholars have expressed various opinions regarding the fall of Ayub Khan. For example, Haider (2016) stated that the immediate causes of the fall of Ayub's regime were the presidential elections and the Indo-Pak war in 1965. In January 1965, Ayub was elected as president through the electoral college of Basic Democrats who were elected through Ayub's Basic Democracies system. Ayub was accused of rigging and his Basic Democracy was held responsible for Miss Fatima Jinnah's loss who was more popular with the general public. The 1965 war was largely a question of Ayub Khan's strategy, intention, and tactics. Historians believe that it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who led Ayub to a military disaster for achieving political benefits and later became a strong opponent of Ayub Khan. Haider (2016) has explained how Ayub Khan's policies just aimed to prolong his reign. He neglected some very important issues including the case of East Pakistan. Although the fall of East Pakistan happened two years after Ayub's reign, many believed it was the fallout of his policies.

Barki (1972) has given a socio-economic explanation for the fall of Ayub's regime. He points out the so-called economic growth as a result of economic inequality. 22 families controlled around 80% of national wealth. The economic development was qualitative, not quantitative and it couldn't stop the rise in prices so that the general public could take advantage. There were a plethora of economic reasons which overburdened Ayub's downfall. Shahid Javed Burki (1972) rightly identified the fundamental disconnect between the public and the Ayub's junta that celebrated 10 years of being in power by highlighting GDP growth and other inflated macroeconomic indicators. The general public, however, cared less about the aggregate statistics as they struggled without much success against price inflation and spatial income disparities. Burki points out that the so-called economic growth was rooted in income inequality, which worsened over time between regions and among people with the growth in the macroeconomy.

The result was evident: half of the industrial wealth accrued to Chinoties in Punjab and the immigrant Memons, Bohras, and Khojas. At the same time, General Ayub opened the door to foreign experts who were ignorant of, and alien to, the political economy of Pakistan. Yet they came armed with policies that might have worked elsewhere but were ill-suited for Pakistan's challenges. General Ayub's economic prowess need not be discounted entirely. His penchant for central planning is evident in the second five-year plan. The inflow of foreign capital, at twice the rate of that of India, sparked growth in industries that supported consumer goods. One must also review what drove the growth and what industrial sectors blossomed as a result. It was primarily driven by foreign aid, the same way General Musharraf's rule was buttressed by American aid after 9/11, 2001. By December 1961, foreign aid was more than twice the size of foreign loans. With the second five-year plan in 1964, foreign aid was responsible for 40% of the total investment. Foreign aid covered 66% of the cost of imports. Despite the foreign investment as aid and credit, and the aggressive public works program pursued by the regime to generate new jobs, unemployment persisted and even worsened during the second five-year plan. The regime allocated twice as much for atomic energy than it did for technical training.

A critical report by none other than Dr. Mehboob ul Haq, the then Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, revealed that a coterie of just 20 families controlled two-thirds of the industry and three-fourths of the banking. Pakistan's poet laureate, Habib Jalib, could not ignore the injustice. His poetry galvanized the public as he recited poems at gatherings where tens of thousands heard him denounce the 20 nouveau riche, who became even richer at the cost of keeping millions poor. Jalib wrote, "Bis gharanay hein abaad / Or karorron hein nashaad / Sadar Ayub Zindabad" (Haider, 2016).

General Ayub's years preferred treatment of West Pakistan irked East Pakistanis, who couldn't ignore the sustained rebukes when General Ayub placed three of the largest legacy projects, i.e., the construction of the new capital (Islamabad) and the two large hydel projects (Mangla and Tarbela) in West Pakistan. Furthermore, General Ayub never kept a confidante from East Pakistan as all the King's men belonged to West Pakistan.

After the complete study of the economic policies of Ayub Khan, we conclude that the economic growth was quantitative and not qualitative. It was highly dependent on foreign aid and foreign loans. Some powerful families were controlling most of the industries and bank

assets. Another problem was that the development and economic growth were of no use for common people. There was no control over price growth. Lastly, it was the disparity in the developmental field too as the development was restricted mostly to Punjab and Karachi. East Pakistan and the small provinces of West Pakistan were mostly ignored and that led to crises throughout the country (Hussain, 2006). East Pakistan largely remained dissatisfied during Ayub's regime. East Pakistan was the bigger part of Pakistan but right since the independence, it was treated much less than other parts of Pakistan. It is an atrocious truth that since independence all the governments including that of Ayub Khan had neglected East Pakistan. Like his predecessors, he did nothing to decrease the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. He was aware of the acute grievances of the Bengalis, but he did not try to tackle them seriously. As Bengal was a densely populated and politicized province, its feeling of deprivation was increased by the absence of democratic institutions in Ayub's highly centralized regime. They were the ones, who opposed the military regimes more than anyone else. Ayub Khan's introduction of EBD and arrests of highly dignified Bengali political leaders further increased their grievances. The economic disparity was another big problem due to which tensions raised between East and West Pakistan. East Pakistan had a stable and better economy than West Pakistan at the time of Independence. In 1949-50, The GDP of East Pakistan was Rs. 13,130 million rupees and that of West Pakistan was Rs. 11,830 million.

Jute, rice, and tea were some of the biggest exports but the earnings were mostly spent in West Pakistan with a small part given to East Pakistan. In 1960, 75% of export earnings originated from the Eastern wing but their lifestyle remained at the lowest level as compared to others. Bengali leaders claimed that "What was earned in East Pakistan was spent here in West Pakistan." The development was mostly restricted to West Pakistan. Except for establishing a few Universities, the West Pakistan rulers were not interested in the development of East Pakistan. Projects like Katpai Dam and Karnaphuli paper mills remained a source of discontent as the Dam affected 40000 people were not compensated. The Karnaphuli paper mills worked in such a way that East Pakistan paid for the transportation of paper to West Pakistan (Mustafa & Nawaz 2014).

The major issue that created disparity was representation. This was the key problem that deprived East Pakistan. The military was fully controlled by West Pakistan. West Pakistan had a

total representation of 845 high-ranked officers including Majors and above. East Pakistan had only 14 in that range. East Pakistan was underrepresented in almost all the sectors of governance (Baxter, Malik, Kennedy & Oberst, 1981). So it was the disparity of all kinds that led to tensions in East Pakistan. Comparatively less development, less representation, economic exploitation, and low standard of life were the biggest reasons for dissatisfaction of East Pakistan. They led to chaos in East Pakistan and ultimately to the fall of Ayub Khan's regime.

Lawrence Ziring (1981) says that economic development is not the same as political development. In Ayub's military regime, Pakistan made big economic gains but it had almost zero political change. Political development mostly tends towards social awareness and less towards social conflicts. Bureaucratic politics was at the peak in Ayub Khan's regime.

Media was tightly controlled under Ayub's regime. Siddiqui (2001) stated that the media and press were not independent. The Pakistan Times, Imroze, and Mashriq were placed under National Press Trust. It meant that the papers would go to the public after the government's approval. Control over press and media was very tight. According to an ordinance in 1960, Ayub Khan introduced the Press and Publications Ordinance which dealt with all the printing presses to submit security deposits for publishing newspapers and books. The government could forfeit the security deposit and could stop the printing presses from publishing newspapers or a book if the matter contained:

- a) Reports on crimes of violence or sex produced in a manner to excite unhealthy curiosity or interfere in administrative laws;
- b) Encourage the commission of the offense as murder or any offense of violence;
- c) Directly or indirectly targets the sovereignty or creation of Pakistan;
- d) Spreading hatred in any group of the country; and
- e) Highlight the feeling of enmity between the people of West and East Pakistan.

The Press and Publications Ordinance (1960) seemed adequate to emasculate the press. But after lifting martial law, Ayub was faced with the challenge of mobilizing 'political support for his regime and needed a totally subdued press. Hence, the scope of press freedom was further curtailed. This was done through ordinances known as the Press and Publications (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance, 1963, and the Press and Publications (East Pakistan Second

Amendment) Ordinance, 1963 (The daily Dawn, November 7, 2010). Similarly, on September 2, 1963, Ayub Khan started his control of the press by taking over the independent papers, namely the Pakistan Times, Imroze, and weekly Lail-o-Nahar. The Press and Publication Amendment Ordinance are known as the “National Press Trust” took over at least fourteen established dailies and weeklies and their chain papers including the Pakistan Times, Imroz, Morning News, and Mashriq. This was the government's aim to stop unauthorized publications. But it badly crushed the freedom of the press and media. Nationalizing the press and media killed the hopes of public awareness of actual government policies and the problem of Pakistan. Almost all the publications were directly or indirectly controlled by the government. Most of them were used for the government's advertising purpose and praising the policies of the regime (Parveen & Bhatti, 2018). This oppression of the press and media was the root cause of zero awareness in Ayub Khan's rule.

Jahan (1970) is of the opinion that the problem of East-West Pakistan integration is known to everyone. Ayub Khan did nothing for national integration. The problems that affected integration during Ayub's era were economic, developmental, and representational. West Pakistan was in relatively good and stable conditions. It was getting all the attention from the center in developmental work but that was restricted to Punjab and Karachi. Punjab in specific was the focus of Ayub Khan and his company's developmental work. Karachi was made the center of industries and other heavy businesses. There was not much development other than Punjab and some part of Sindh. This led to crises all over the country (Maniruzzaman, 1967). The Provinces in West Pakistan were unhappy with the One Unit System. Punjab was the center of development throughout the regime. Other provinces couldn't get enough attention and it was causing tensions in the people of the erstwhile NWFP (now KP), Sindh, and Baluchistan. Movements were started in these provinces calling for equal attention and opposing the One-Unit Systems. The issues in East Pakistan were relatively bigger. It even couldn't get attention like smaller provinces in West Pakistan. East Pakistanis had no other option but to revolt against the regime (Jahan, 1970). These were the chore issues in the national integration of Pakistan during Ayub Khan's reign. First, there were differences between East and West Pakistan over the development and representation. Then there was the opposition of the One-Unit System in West Pakistan as the small provinces were mostly ignored. These problems were enough to fail the

national integration of Pakistan. East Pakistan contributed 54% of the population and was different from West Pakistan in terms of language, culture, social structure, demographic characteristics, and historical traditions. Also, different groups were living in West Pakistan. The common saying about Ayub's regime was that "All the developments happened in Punjab and Karachi". The rest of the country rarely got benefits from Ayub's economic development.

Rizvi (1974) thinks that Ayub Khan's military regime was the first of many. Pakistan suffered a total of 4 military reigns but it was Ayub who paved the way for the rest. The military regimes might have happened out of necessity but the main objectives of all were supreme powers. The dictatorial approach has severely affected the political development process in Pakistan and was the main cause of the downfall of the military leader.

The universal adult franchise was curtailed by the system of Basic Democracies. The system of Basic Democracies introduced by Ayub Khan consisted of rural and urban councils directly elected by the people that would be concerned with local governance and would assist in programs of grassroots development. Basic democracy was a tiered system inextricably linked to the bureaucracy and occupied the lowest rung of a ladder that was connected to the country's administrative sub-districts (Tehsils), districts, and divisions. Later, under the constitution of 1962, Basic Democracy units were to become the Electoral College for the election of the president and the National Assembly (Khan, 1965). Thus Basic Democracies were taken as nothing more than a convenience for the rulers. It would be difficult to decide what the Basic Democracies could have achieved if they had been allowed to function in the way they were theoretically set up to do. Some evidence exists especially in East Bengal that they could have created cooperative communities, but they were misused from the beginning. In East Pakistan, BD was extensively bribed with the free use of public funds and it was hoped to create a vested interest in Ayub's rule. The system was largely influenced by the bureaucrats who dominated the decision-making in most of Ayub Khan's rule. The system was often related to the decentralization of powers in the political arena but in reality, it was only restricted to the decentralization of developmental authority. The system failed to increase political participation and could not improve the democratic culture. The system provided stability and security to the president but did not strengthen the political system itself. No development happened in the political system and political culture. The system also led to the introduction of rural elites

(Ziring, 1971). The biggest criticism made on Basic Democracies was that it acted as an electoral college for the election of the president. The right to vote through universal adult franchise was denied and the elections could be easily bribed, bought, and paid for.

There was bureaucratic politics and the rural elite's involvement in policymaking. The era of Ayub Khan was deprived of any kind of political participation as politicians and political bodies were banned. The system had very limited powers for the Basic Democrats. In most cases, they could not use those powers correctly. They were controlled by the local upper class and bureaucrats. The BD system was almost entirely controlled by the bureaucracy. Professionalism, competence, and honesty, which were the hallmark of the British system, started giving way to cronyism, pliability, and dishonesty both intellectual and financial. This was more true in the case of senior officers who would go to any length to please their superiors (Siddiqui, 2001).

Ayub Khan's anti-corruption stance was applied to bureaucracy in the starting years of his reign. They were asked to show all their assets for cleaning bureaucracy from corruption. After some time, the bureaucracy started to rise in the policy-making process as there was no political participation. The higher bureaucracy was actually ruling most of the affairs of the state. The corruption started rising once again in bureaucracy. Corruption was mainly the outcome of high prices at that time. The common people had no trust in bureaucracy and the rise in corruption led to high criticism of bureaucracy. As bureaucracy was one of the pillars of Ayub's regime its weakness indirectly made the Ayub's regime weak and led to the fall of Ayub Khan (Ziring, 1981). Similarly, corruption was rising in local bodies and there was no proper check on it.

Politicians and political parties were disqualified by instruments such as the Elected Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) passed in 1959 which was promulgated for the disqualification of politicians. Under this law, a person could be disqualified from being a member of any elective body. Under this harsh law, 75 leaders were disqualified for participating in political activities for 8 years (until December 1966). Several politicians like Suhrawardy and Qayyum Khan were disqualified. The EBDO, particularly its application, was severely criticized in the legal and political circles throughout Pakistan. Under the EBDO, Ayub Khan primarily targeted East Pakistani politicians from the Awami League while leaving the Muslim League largely untouched (Latif, 2019). EBDO was meant to get rid of all those political elements that

could offer resistance or come in the way of Gen Ayub's political ambitions. The system did not spare anyone against whom even the slightest charge of misconduct could be investigated. The democratic process in Pakistan was always slow and this ordinance completely killed the little progress we made in the democratic process. Through disqualification and arrest of highly influential politicians, Ayub paved the way for a pretty long 10 years rule without much resistance (Mehboob, 2017). However, the restrictions were counterproductive and helped in bringing down his downfall.

Ayub Khan's foreign policy was strongly based on the name of his book "Friends not Masters". He never compromised on his stance but some of his policies did turn the tables on him (Khan, 1967). Ayub Khan was a great modernizer. He made Pakistan, the most trusted ally of the US and the West. Pakistan also had good relations with China and stable relations with USSR. Two of his biggest achievements that turned him into a world statesman were the settlement of border dispute with the People's Republic of China which created an everlasting basis for Sino-Pakistan friendship and the Indus Basin Treaty for the division of waters between India and Pakistan. These were recognized as acts of great courage and vision. Ayub's relations with the US came under great strain when he failed to respond to President Kennedy's suggestion, during the Indo-China War in 1962, that Pakistan should cooperate with India in order to enable the latter to deal with 'the Chinese threat'. Ayub insisted that unless the Kashmir dispute was settled on equitable terms there could be no cooperation between India and Pakistan. Ayub did not know at the time that he had quite unknowingly frustrated a possible Indo-American program to subjugate China. The Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, had written to Kennedy 'a hysterical letter' suggesting the bombing of certain targets in China a few days before the Chinese declared a surprise cease-fire (Khan, 2006).

Two other decisions had far-reaching implications for Ayub. He served notice on the US in April 1968 terminating the lease for the communications base in Peshawar. The notorious U2 aircraft that took off from this base was shot down over the Soviet Union. Khrushchev told foreign correspondents in Moscow that he had drawn a red circle around Peshawar. This came as a complete surprise to the US administration, and when, immediately after the notice was served, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin visited Pakistan, this caused further concern in Washington.

About this time Ayub decided to go ahead with the construction of the Sinkiang Road despite the opposition of his own Commander-in-Chief who pleaded that the army engineers could not complete the job without taking the undue risk of loss of life. A Chinese delegation came to Pakistan and offered to undertake the road works in areas that the Pakistani engineers considered hazardous. Ayub accepted the offer much to the annoyance of the Americans. After that, the Americans saw no reason to support Ayub who responded by declaring that he wanted the Americans as 'friends not masters'. The most 'allied-ally' of the United States in Asia had turned 'radical' through contact with the People's Republic of China.

Tashkent Agreement, no support from the US in the 1965 War, and strained relations with the USSR in the last years of his regime were the main failures of Ayub Khan's foreign policy. Tashkent Agreement in particular united the political groups against Ayub Khan. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayub's Foreign Minister, and a big companion, also left him after discontent on the agreement. Ayub Khan was left with no support after Bhutto rose as a big opponent to his policies and it started the decline of the first military regime. Tashkent's agreement was marked as the beginning of Ayub's downfall. The Soviet Union, which had remained neutral when India and Pakistan went to war in September 1965, played the broker afterward at Tashkent. The Soviet government formally announced on December 8, 1965, that the Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the Pakistani President, Muhammad Ayub Khan would meet at Tashkent on January 4, 1966. Largely due to the efforts of Soviet Premier Kosygin, India and Pakistan signed the Tashkent Declaration (Bajwa, 2013). The significant clauses of this agreement were:

- a) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree to make all efforts to establish good relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They affirm to renounce the use of force in the settlement of their disputes.
- b) The President of Pakistan and the Indian Prime Minister agree to withdraw, no later than February 25, 1966, all armed personnel to the position held before August 5, 1964.
- c) Both India and Pakistan agree to follow the principle of non-interference in their affairs and will discourage the use of any propaganda against each other.

- d) Both the countries also agree to reopen normal diplomatic functioning and return the High Commissioners of both the countries to their posts.
- e) Measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between the two countries were to be taken. Measures were to be taken to implement the existing agreements between Pakistan and India.
- f) Prisoners of war would be repatriated.
- g) Discussions would continue relating to the problem of refugees and eviction of illegal immigrants. Both sides will create conditions that will prevent the exodus of the people.

In Pakistan, the common narrative about the Tashkent agreement was that we lost on the table. It is believed that Ayub Khan signed the agreement without consent from Bhutto. Bhutto while addressing the UN stated that we will fight for Kashmir in any condition. Bhutto was keen on the solution of the Kashmir issue when he finally had the world's attention. He did not back out of his stance on Kashmir till the end. When Ayub Khan signed the agreement, Bhutto remained no longer his companion. He started exposing the Tashkent agreement which led to a massive fall in Ayub's popularity (Burki, 1971).

The 1965 elections were another point in the downfall of Ayub Khan. The elections were indirect and mostly rigged in favor of Ayub Khan. The "Basic Democracies" proved only to be helpful to the powerful candidates as pre-poll rigging was reported. Popular candidates lost because of basic democracies as it was Ayub's system and the members supported him because of that.

The 17 days long war between Pakistan and India brought severe consequences. Both India and Pakistan claim to have won the war but the independent observers disagree with this claim. Pakistan and India both couldn't reach their aims. Pakistan started the war for Kashmir, but couldn't get an inch of it. India struck Lahore with full force to destroy Pakistan but the move proved to be highly unsuccessful. However, the war proved to be a huge drawback in Pakistan's growing economy. The war was a completely unplanned, fruitless, and unfinished event. The war of 1965 highlighted the Kashmir issue. Bhutto created so much hype about Kashmir that the international community was ready to work for the solution of the Kashmir issue. Bhutto was not ready for a cease-fire until the Kashmir issue was resolved but Ayub Khan suddenly called for a

ceasefire. This move was not well received by most parts of the country and somehow led to the decline of Ayub Khan (Rabbani, 2011).

In October of 1968, the government selected the Fortress Stadium in Lahore to celebrate the military dictator. In preparation for the parades for the “Decade of Development,” the government told Punjab University students to attend the celebration. They wanted the entire stadium to be filled. To rebel, students of the National Student Federation prepared a song titled “The Decade of Sadness” that critiqued the “Decade of Development.” Once parades had started within the stadium, students began to sing their songs, shocking the audience. Following this resistance, the government began to repress and fight against protests (Mansoor, 2018).

In Rawalpindi, on 7 November 1968, the police opened fire on a student rally against the government for the killing of three students which led to the creation of a Student Action Committee. This committee was another student-led action group, apart from the National Students Federation, that sought to increase the effectiveness of student action. The committee selected Sheikh Abdul Rasheed as the coordinator, but the police later arrested him while he was leading a student rally in Rawalpindi. The reaction was even stronger as a complete strike paralyzed the city for a whole day.

Another factor in these movements was the political mobilization initiated by Z. A. Bhutto in both urban and rural areas. The students were soon joined by industrial workers, peasants, intellectuals, and journalists. The protest intensified with time and turned into a mass movement against the regime. The government tried to stop it by oppression and then by dialogue but the pressure inserted was too much to control.

Industrialization in Pakistan came in Ayub's Era. The development and industrial growth were tempting people for shifting to big cities. Urbanization was on the rise in Pakistan and there were not enough facilities to support it. Urbanization without proper planning was leading to several problems including public health, infrastructural, and sanitation issues. Industrialization was leading to a rise in pollution and waste in industrial cities. This was leading to different kinds of disease especially in streets' children (Haider, 2010).

In 1962, Ayub wanted to author a new constitution and form his own party. He called for a convention of some leading Muslim League and Republican Party members. The convention

announced the formation of a new Muslim League. However, it became PML-Convention when some other ML leaders refused to join it and formed their own faction. PML-Convention's manifesto echoed the political and economic tenor of the Ayub regime: Rapid industrialization, free-market enterprise, and 'Muslim modernism' with emphasis on science and technology. The PML-Convention became the majority party in a parliament elected through Ayub's complex 'Basic Democracy' system. Ayub was chosen as the party's chief and a young Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became its first Secretary-General. However, the strength of PML-Convention was temporary. Making of a new party was nothing but protecting the president. PML-Convention won in 1965 with a heavy margin. It got a huge majority in Assembly and also Ayub Khan won the presidential election. The elections faced a huge backlash on charges of pre-poll rigging. It was completely wiped out in the next elections. Awami League and Pakistan People's Party emerged as the biggest parties in Pakistan. The results of the 1970 elections proved that the strength of PML-Convention was fictional and temporary.

Unlike General Zia ul Haq (1977-1988), who spent 11 years of his dictatorial rule to Islamize Pakistan, General Ayub was more of a modernist who was wary of the attempts to Islamize Pakistan. While addressing a seminary he articulated his views as "This I consider a great disservice to Islam, that such a noble religion should be represented as inimical to progress ... In fact, it is a great injustice to both life and religion to impose on twentieth-century man the condition that he must go back several centuries to prove his bonfires as a true Muslim." General Ayub's most significant and long-lasting contribution is the promulgation of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance in 1961 that empowered women, especially in the matters of marriage and divorce. Though the commission that drafted the recommendations was constituted in 1954, the Ayub regime took steps to implement the laws empowering women. Before the family laws were enacted, neither marriages nor divorces were required to be registered with the state. This created severe hardships for divorced women, some of whom eventually remarried. Their former husbands could, and some even did out of malice, accuse them of adultery since the women lacked proof of divorce from the first husband. The new laws also required men who desired a second wife to seek formal consent from the first wife. In summary, the acts and ordinances introduced by the Ayub regime discouraged polygamy, "protected the rights of wives and granted the rights of inheritance to grandchildren." Despite his belief and the desire to modernize the society, General Ayub was quick to give into religious orthodoxy as long as the policy about

turns prolonged his control overpower. Similarly, naming Pakistan as the “Republic of Pakistan” by dropping the word “Islamic” in the 1962 Constitution also made the religious section of the society turn against him.

A single incident that changed the domestic situation dramatically was Ayub’s illness. In January 1968, he was stricken by a heart attack. The news of his critical illness became known and a spate of wild rumors engulfed the country. Ayub's temporary absence created a vacuum that exposed the ineffectiveness of the institutions he had created. The President House was cordoned and the Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan set up a private command post to stay with the governing bodies. Ayub Khan recovered after 2 weeks but everyone was sure that he won't bear the load of another election. The anti-Ayub movement got rapid pace and put him under more pressure.

Consequences of the Fall of Ayub Khan

The Fall of Ayub Khan was nothing but just a change of a leader as another military dictator, Yahya Khan, took his place. But it did have some serious consequences on the future of Pakistan. Some of the consequences of Ayub's fall are:

a) *Another Military Regime:* The fall of Ayub Khan led to the beginning of yet another military regime. The circumstances in 1958 and 1969 were not much different. Yahya Khan declared martial law in the country to end the current tensions across the county to silence the voices of those fighting against Ayub's regime. Yahya Khan was doing everything as told by the political parties (Wilcox, 1969).

b) *Restoration of the Democratic System:* The fall of Ayub Khan was a sign of hope for finally restoring the democratic system in the country. When Yahya Khan took charge of the country, he announced that the democratic process will be restored. The parliamentary form of democracy was going to come back. Fresh elections were going to be organized based on direct elections. The right to vote according to the universal adult franchise was restored. Pakistan was finally going to witness the perfect democratic system.

c) *1970 Elections and Transfer of Power:* These were the first direct elections held in Pakistan based on adult franchise and were also said to be the freest and fair ever noted in the country’s history. Polls for National Assembly seats were held on December 7, 1970, with

provincial assemblies' elections on December 17, 1970. The optimism surrounding the event was visible amidst increased tensions between what was then known as East and West Pakistan. The elections were held under Yahya Khan's Legal Framework Order (LFO) of March 30, 1970. Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman's Awami League (AL) from the East and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) from West Pakistan were the front-runners in the campaign for these elections. Being Pakistan's first-ever direct elections, countries both friendly and not so much were keen to observe the process (Al-Mujahid, 1971). The national polls were swept by the Awami League which secured 167 out of 313 NA seats making it the single largest party in the country. Moreover, Bhutto's PPP, which stood largely in opposition to AL, managed to secure 82 seats in the National Assembly. It looked like the Awami League was finally going to reap the fruits of all the hard work they have done for a democratic Pakistan. But the leaders in West Pakistan including Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and others were stopping the process of transfer of power to East Pakistan. They did anything possible for it and even sacrificed East Pakistan. It was the darkest period in the history of Pakistan when a party that had doubled the majority of runners was robbed of its right to rule (Naeem, 2020). Ayub Khan was the main factor in the fall of East Pakistan. Ayub Khan's regime exploited East Pakistan by using their exports for profit without giving them enough in return. The disparity was at the peak in economy, development and representation. This led to a rise in anti-Ayub's movements in East Pakistan that continued till the fall of East Pakistan.

d) *End of a Progressive Era:* The fall of Ayub Khan marked the end of a progressive era. Pakistan's status rose in the international community. Ayub Khan's work in industrial development was also a big plus point in future perspectives. The economic growth was not stable and qualitative but still, Pakistan gained enough benefits from it by reorganizing the state machinery. The fall of Ayub Khan led to nothing but more tensions across the country. The biggest of them was of course the tensions in East Pakistan over the transfer of power leading to war and the fall of East Pakistan in 1971. All these incidents stopped the process of development and economic growth. Pakistan remained highly unstable in its internal affairs for the coming few years.

Major Findings:

The major finding of this study are listed below

- a) Ayub Khan's downfall is mostly related to his political failures. His era is known for economic growth and development but this statement is often criticized. The economic growth was not a qualitative one as it was strongly based on foreign aids and debts. His era of development couldn't make people's lives better because of economic disparity and continuous rise in prices;
- b) The Basic Democracy system failed miserably as a political system. It was criticized for the indirect election process, making of rural elites, and high ratio of pre-polls rigging;
- c) The fall of East Pakistan happened two years later after Ayub's fall but he laid the foundation for it. East Pakistan was kept backward in economic growth and developmental work. Another big problem was the exploitation of East Pakistan. Rice, tea, and jute from East Pakistan were the biggest part of Pakistani exports and still, East Pakistan was not given any proper share in the income.
- d) Nonpolitical movements played a big role in the downfall of Ayub Khan. They criticized Ayub Khan's policies and exposed his hollow claims of what he called "Decade of Development". They were well supported by journalists, laborers, industrial workers, teachers, intellectuals, and the majority of the urban class.
- e) Ayub Khan after the disqualification of the big politicians thought the political bodies and political activities were no more threatening but he was wrong. Political participation rose to a high level after the ban was removed.
- f) Ayub Khan's martial paved the way for more military takeovers in the future. Martial law was prohibited in Pakistan for a long period but few incidents in Ayub Khan's rule legalized it after the courts started working under the military regime.
- g) The objective of Ayub Khan throughout his rule was more power. He did everything possible to spread the limits of his powers. He presented a very centralized constitution in 1962 where the presidential system was introduced.

Conclusion

The fall of Ayub Khan was a result of his policies in every field. It's not just political, he made blunders in almost every field. All of his policies lacked proper implementation despite looking good on paper. He did everything just to protect and prolong his reign. Presidential form

of government, basic democracies, and joining a political party is a few of them. His economic policies were also never perfect. The economic growth was only qualitative and the people couldn't bear the fruits. The case of East Pakistan was royally ignored by Ayub Khan just like the rulers of Pakistan in the past. Political movements started against Ayub in different parts of the country by the opposition. They were soon followed by anti-Ayub movements from the student, lawyers, teachers, and people from different fields of life. In January 1968, he was affected by a viral infection and his health at the end of the year further deteriorated. In February 1969, he said he will not participate in elections. This set the stage for Yahya Khan.

Between 1958 and 1971 President Ayub Khan, through autocratic rule was able to centralize the government. Khan brought together an alliance of a predominantly Punjabi army and civil bureaucracy with the small but influential industrial class as well as segments of the landed elite, to replace the parliamentary government with a system of Basic Democracies. The basic Democracies code was founded on the premise of Khan's diagnosis that the politicians and their "free-for-all" type of fighting had had an ill effect on the country. He, therefore, disqualified all old politicians under the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, 1959 (EBDO). The Basic Democracies system did not empower the individual citizens to participate in the democratic process but opened up the opportunity to bribe and buy votes from the limited voters.

By giving the civil bureaucracy a part in electoral politics, Khan had hoped to bolster central authority and largely American-directed, programs for Pakistan's economic development. But his policies exacerbated existing disparities between the provinces which gave the grievances of the Eastern wing a potency that threatened the very centralized control Khan was trying to establish. In West Pakistan, notable successes in increasing productivity were more than offset by growing inequalities in the agrarian sector and their lack of representation, an agonizing process of urbanization, and the concentration of wealth in a few industrial houses. In the aftermath of the 1965 war with India, mounting regional discontent in East Pakistan and urban unrest in West Pakistan helped undermine Ayub Khan's authority, forcing him to relinquish power in March 1969.

After the end of 10 years long reign nothing changed much as Pakistan went to another military regime. The economic growth that was on the rise for years now started declining. The relations with India got worst as the chaos continued throughout the country. Ayub Khan didn't

want Pakistan to have yet another martial law but he could not stop it. In short, Pakistan remained highly unstable after Ayub Khan's regime.

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