

Kashmir: Its Role the Region and Impact on Pakistan and India

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Abstract

This paper examines the role of Kashmir in the region and how it impacts Pakistan-India affairs. Furthermore, it explains the contemporary mutual relations of Pakistan and India about the Kashmir clash. The clash's historical background clarifies how the Kashmir struggle has turned into a thistle in Pakistan and India's reciprocal relations. By assessing the Pakistan-Indian harmony process, I recommend why the Kashmir clash still opposes a solution. By looking at the government types, institutional doubt, the monetary co-activity, and rivalry of the two nations, I investigate the kind of reciprocal relationship and its effect on the South Asian Region. Finally, I contend that as long as Pakistan and India stick to their historical positions, there is no shot for changeless harmony in Kashmir, subsequently confounding their key position in the region.

Keywords: Pakistan, India, Kashmir, South Asia, and Conflict.

Introduction

Pakistan and India generally see one another as enemies. Inferable from the absence of trust, the two states take different steps to assurance their national security and interest:

1. They find a way to fortify their military power, which activates the arms competition in the region.
2. To accomplish perceived leverage, they are building coalitions as key associations with worldwide forces.
3. Pakistan underpins an uprising in India's different parts, and the same India does with Pakistan.

Being the main opponents, they take part in such deception to debilitate one another. At last, they even contend in another nation (Afghanistan) to increase their interests. The Kashmir difference is the most intractable international conflict emerging after the British divided the subcontinent of India. As far back as British India's partition into Pakistan and India in 1947, Kashmir turned into a festering battle between the two nations. The two nations fought three battles over Kashmir (1947, 1965, and 1999) and another battle over Bangladesh (1971), wherein Kashmir was an outlying subject. The testing of atomic weapons by Pakistan and India in 1998 marked the obvious

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"nuclearization" of the Kashmir clash. Mounting rebellion and prevalent flooding protests in Kashmir are proceeding with terrorist incidents, and continuous border conflicts have changed the Kashmir valley, the natural heaven, into a Death Valley. Pakistan believes that Kashmir is vital for its national security, attributable to its geopolitical connection. It also considers Kashmir as a monetary lifeline since the waters of Pakistan's main river frameworks lay in Kashmir. As such, its agriculture is dependent partially on the rivers of Kashmir. Therefore, Mukherjee stated that "water has been integral to the Kashmir debate, and Pakistan's frailty concerning water supplies in the future and will increment provincial instability (Mukherjee, 2009: 283)." Accordingly, leaders of Pakistan have scarcely adjusted themselves with the loss of Jammu. And leaders of Indian have similarly restricted the withdrawal of Jammu from the league of India. It ruined Pakistan and India's mutual relations and changed Kashmir into the world's most armed region.

Research Questions

- Why does the Kashmir struggle oppose a peaceful assigned solution?
- How does Kashmir influence the reciprocal relationship between Pakistan and India?

Methodology

It is a qualitative analysis that depends on the technique for a documentary examination. I have included primary and secondary sources. As far as essential reports, I have utilized official speeches and statements of the presidents, head administrators, and foreign ministers of the two nations, just as original leadership documents relating to the Kashmir struggle. I additionally focused on newspaper articles about the dispute. As far as secondary sources, I have inspected journal articles, books, and published papers.

Peace process (The U.N. phase)

Having occupied 66% of the Kashmir, Jawaharlal Nehru (Indian Prime Minister) formally objected to the U.N. in 1947: he drew the intrusion by Pakistan to the immediate consideration of the Security Council. This empowered India to put the Kashmir strife under the global radar. Affected by Cold War governmental issues, the Security Council passed a progression of resolutions. The Council required the two nations to consent to a truce along the LoC (Line of Control) in 1948. The holding of a fair-minded referendum trailed it to determine the desires of the individuals of Kashmir under the protection of a UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan). At first, the two nations consented to conform to the resolutions (Yusuf & Najam, 2009: 1503).

Meanwhile, Sheik Abdullah, the well-known leader of N.C. (National Conference Party), supported the agreement and drove the government until 1953; the territory under Indian control was named Kashmir and Jammu, with special status allowed under Article 370 of the law. He had no authority over the regions under Pakistani control, named Azad Kashmir. Sheik Abdullah's choice adjusted the norm and changed the Princely State's predetermination for the last time. His

choice likewise solidified the position of Nehru. Despite the past acknowledgment of UNCIP recommendations on holding a referendum, Nehru, step by step, moved his situation regarding its interpretations. In 1949, British Prime Minister Clement Atlee and American President Truman encouraged Nehru to acknowledge the discretion of the UNCIP. But Nehru rejected their recommendation and pronounced that "he would not offer a bit of land on the matter of Kashmir (Indurthy, 2005: 31)." However, the uncooperative position of Delhi on the matter of the referendum, the Security Council didn't abandon the issue. In 1949, the Council called McNaughton (U.N. President) to break the deadlock in Kashmir. Be that as it may, India dismissed his proposition on neutralization and the referendum, referring to them as supporting Pakistan.

When the McNaughton efforts turned unsuccessful, the Security Council called Sir Owen Dixon (High Court judge of Australia) to break the deadlock. In the mid-year of 1950, Dixon submitted a proposition restricting Kashmir's vote while dividing the rest of the region into religious lines. Since Nehru does not accept the possibility of U.N. control of Kashmir during the referendum, his proposition was likewise unsuccessful in leaping forward. Toward the end, he suggested the United Nations give up its intervention and allow the two nations to discover a solution to the conflict. Without surrendering, the Security Council authorized U.S. Senator Dr. Forthcoming Graham as U.N. arbiter. During the phase 1951-53, he made frantic efforts to persuade Nehru to consent to a state-wide referendum; however, without any result. In the interim, the ground circumstances began evolving fast. From one viewpoint, Pakistan turned into the USA's close partner to join the USA made Baghdad Pact and the SEATO in 1954.

Also, the USA providing arms and ammo to Pakistan was seen as a disagreeable demonstration towards India. Then again, India immovably committed to the arrangement of non-alignment. At that point, John Foster Dulles (U.S. Secretary of State) took an unfriendly opinion towards India and condemned its arrangement of non-alignment as indecent and foolhardy. Furthermore, Nehru sacked Abdullah as the legislature leader in Kashmir for calling for freedom for the state and appointed Ghulam Muhammed in 1953. Consequently, Bakshi Muhammed approves Kashmir's agreement with India (1954). The confirmation abandoned any prospect for the referendum later on. Nehru acknowledged the parliament's election as identical to a referendum and proclaimed Kashmir as an indispensable portion of India (1956). In any case, Pakistan has not accepted these wrong moves and is constantly called a referendum (Das, 2001). Besides, India arrested Sheik Abdullah for denouncing the ratification. Accordingly, the circumstances on the ground wound up volatile. At this point, the Security Council of the U.N., at long last, appointed Jarring to break the logjam. He presented a doubtful report to the Council, bringing up that "changing strategic, financial, and political elements surrounding the entire inquiry of Kashmir reduced the accomplishment of global deals, of an unplanned character, dynamically more difficult (Mohan, 1992)." Also, India did not accept his suggestion of having direct discussions among Pakistan and India under the U.N. sponsorship on neutralization and referendum, whereas Pakistan acknowledged it. His disappointment set the last nail in the box of U.N. intercession. As a rule, the U.N. could neither improve nor fix the conflict.

The Meeting Stage

The pattern changed in geopolitics and speeded the union between groups in mid-2000. After the Cold War, the interests of America different in the region. America ended its past strategy of propping up Afghanistan and Pakistan against the USSR and started a business with the region. In the wake of two atomic emergencies in 1999 and 2001-02, America interested in advancing harmony in the region, empowering Pakistan and India to follow the way of harmony. To advance its business, America favored harmony and soundness in the region. The Prime Minister of India (Mr. Vajpayee) visited Pakistan in 1999, breaking the long periods of diplomatic deadlock. Vajpayee went by bus, introducing the Delhi-Lahore bus.

Additionally, to break the trust shortfall and guarantee India's peaceful expectation, he visited Minar-e-Pakistan. As far as he concerns him, Nawaz Shariff welcomed the Indian Prime Minister against solid resistance from the Islamist Jamaat-I-Islami and the military. Finally, they marked the Lahore Declaration as the general standard to direct Pakistan and India associations in South Asia's atomic security condition (Wheeler, 2010: 319). Besides, a Memo of Understanding was signed. The two sides consented to keep each other up-to-date regarding any ballistic missile tests and upgrade correspondence links that would lessen the danger of an unplanned or unapproved utilization of atomic weapons.

This expectation of harmony was before long dashed away when the Pakistan military crosses the LoC into the Kargil division of Indian-side Kashmir in 1999. After the Lahore Declaration, the two nations engaged with a constrained war, which kept going eleven weeks. America interceded, and Pakistan pulled back its army to the first position after finishing the war. The Kargil scene cast a lasting shadow over the respective relations of Pakistan and India. The Indian media harshly condemned Pakistan, blaming it for deceiving the trust of the Vajpayee. However, Delhi never made the sort of agreement in Lahore that would fulfill Pakistan over Kashmir. Because of the Kargil conflict, Delhi demanded Islamabad to acknowledge the LoC's inviolability and stop terrorism in Kashmir. Realizing that Pakistan couldn't satisfy these needs, India set these unsuitable conditions and slowed down the harmony talks. As India solidified its position towards Pakistan, Musharraf overthrew Sharif's government in 1999 for betraying the nation (Industry, 2005). After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan joined America drove the alliance to battle against the Al Qaeda and Taliban. However, Pakistan ceaselessly upheld the revolt in Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the violent assaults in India and Kashmir specifically expanded in 2000. As tension built, India singularly announced a truce in 2000. Pakistan reacted, offering an agreement along the LoC. Following a half year, Musharraf and Vajpayee met at Agra. Since the two chiefs remained on a very basic level partitioned on the matter of Kashmir, they could not make any progress yet consented to proceed with the procedure of discourse.

The continuous assaults by the Kashmiri activists on the State Assembly and the Indian parliament ruined the peace procedure. India blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorism and decimating the activists' training camps in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Most importantly, India assembled its

army along the LoC and the global boundary, with Pakistan setting off an atomic emergency on the subcontinent. Notwithstanding, following pressure by America, Pakistan and India took measures to decrease the strain. Toward the beginning of 2002, Pakistan vowed to make solid endeavors to prevent invasion. India responded by lifting a prohibition on flights by Pakistani airplanes, which it had forced after the assault on the parliament. Also, it pulled back some of its warships from zones closer to Pakistan (Raghavan, 2009: 242). Both, in the long run, redeployed their army from the basic border. The two nations understood the direness of avoiding future conflicts and a deadly atomic crash in the future. Because of this acknowledgment, the two nations began the Composite Dialog (2004) as a feature of the harmony procedure to normalize affairs. Even though the discourse has made some outstanding progress, it could not determine the center issues.

On the constructive side, the business volume, individuals' contact, and cultural exchanges have expanded. On the other, various rounds of harmony talks, sponsored up by the back-channel discretion, couldn't break the ice encompassing the center matters of Kashmir. During the discourse, Pervez Musharraf (Pakistan President) demonstrated some adaptability and stopped asking for a referendum in Kashmir. Also, he proposed a four-arrange formula for the solution of the Kashmir struggle. The formula required the acknowledgment of Kashmir as an unclear region and a commonly adequate win-win arrangement. In 2004, he set out a three-staged arrangement separating the Kashmir district into seven parts along religious and ethnic lines, at that point neutralizing those regions, lastly, deciding the legitimate position of those areas. India dismissed these propositions outright and clarified its restriction to any partition of Kashmir along religious lines.

Musharraf suggested another solution for the Kashmir strife in 2006, which depended on disarmament, maximum self-administration, and a joint-supervision process. Even though India hypothetically acknowledged the initial two ideas, it emphatically opposed Pakistan and India's idea together managing the whole Kashmir district since it would debilitate its power over the region. Although India dismissed each one of the Pakistani recommendations, it set forward no counter proposition. The Indian political leader was progressively keen on finding an answer for the side effects instead of the main drivers. Realizing that settling on the Kashmir struggle was equivalent to political suicide, the Indian authority demonstrated the most extreme enthusiasm for developing atomic confidence-building measures instead of a solution for the main issues. Therefore, the harmony talks wound up delayed without a result. The bus strategy of the U.S. calmed the strain. India postponed the negotiation and requested that Pakistan honor its formal responsibilities and not allow its ground for terrorism against other nations.

Additionally, India tied the renewal of the combined negotiation with Pakistan to its indictment of every one of those associated with the attacks. Delhi explained that no significant negotiation could be with Islamabad until it satisfied its responsibility to destroy the terrorist framework. Most importantly, India charged the ISI, the main intelligence organization of Pakistan, with arranging the attack. India had a horrible standpoint towards Gilani (Pakistani Prime Minister) and his

administration's endeavors to convict the guilty parties, as the ISI was probably going to oppose the move. In any case, the growing home-developed terrorism and rising international pressure pushed the two nations to continue reciprocal talks. Regardless of the resumption of two-sided discussions, the halt to restart the delayed peace procedure still stays uncertain.

Economic Co-activity

The territorial dispute in Pakistan and India over the Kashmir region is beginning to shade the countries' respective economies. It is predicted to be over 1.4 billion dollars in India's economic damages incurred by the conflict, though Pakistan suffers the Indian suspension of cotton and medicines supplies. Though not capable of reaching a diplomatic settlement, demands are also increasing for neighboring nations to boost economic relations. The special autonomous status of the contested portion of Kashmir, administered by India, was revoked on August 5, 2019, and Pakistan was annoyed. Now that more than a year has passed after Pakistan told India of its decision as a countermeasure to suspend trade with them, adverse consequences have become visible on its economies. India temporarily stopped supplying cheap generic medications. As a result of the ban, alternative medical supplies from the Middle East are rising.

In 2018, exports from India to Pakistan rose 7.4%, which marks more than 5% for the second straight year. Cotton, which relies on its textiles industry, is the most profitable export to India's neighbor. Still, now Pakistan is converting its supplies to Brazil and the U.S. As a part of the conflict, India is now allegedly smuggling Middle East chemicals and other products. However, the situation places more pressure on Pakistan's economy, with its substitute providers costing more premiums than their Indian counterparts. India's anti-terrorist beef-up has triggered an economic deficit due to the curfew, limits on retailer activities, and decreased tourism. Sheik Ashiq Ahmed, chambers chairman, said that access to the internet and social media could not continue to supply Kashmir's silk carpets and craft specialties. As of 2019, Pakistan is the fifth largest country in the world, with 216.5 million. With continued demographic growth in Pakistan and India, two countries are expected to accommodate a total population of 1.8 billion in 2030, comprising over 20% of the planet's population (Moyuru, 2019).

Distrust

The governments' nature in the two nations influences conflict resolution and their reciprocal relations colossally. On account of Pakistan, two power focuses as the insurgently chose civilian government and the ground-breaking military confuse the harmony procedure and the reciprocal relations. The Kashmir struggle and India's resulting battles have made the Pakistani army more grounded throughout the years. Running an immense business empire in Pakistan, the army has incidentally interceded in legislative issues. It has an enormous state over international strategy and the Kashmir struggle. Then again, having seen numerous military upsets, prevalent India's chosen civilian go working under the danger of military mediation. The discontinuous military autocracies have anticipated democratic organizations taking root in the nation. They have

additionally ruined the development of powerful civil social orders that have stakes in harmony. The Pakistani army fears that India can break up its nation and won't settle the Kashmir issue. These fears have solidified the position of the Pakistani army versus India.

In this way, hybrid governments, incredible military, political flimsiness, powerless civil society, and unstable democracy in Pakistan make it hard for a civilian administration to acknowledge politically hazardous decisions connected to Kashmir or make harmony with India. Then again, India has a vibrant, stable democracy. It has entangled into alliance legislative issues. The idea of its constituent procedure will not enable national parties to scope to control. In essence, this implies no single party can lead a strategy that could be viewed as a settlement on Kashmir without certain alliance accomplices' restrictions. Aside from the alliance legislative issues, there is no solid national head in India to cooperate with Pakistan. The political first class is careful not to push a motivation to bring about their misfortune in prevalence pursued by electoral destruction. Likewise, the idea of resistance politics makes it hard for the Congress-overwhelmed UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government to acknowledge any conceivably disliked harmony agreement with Pakistan (Mukherjee, 2009: 283). Historically, the Indian army harbors profound mistrust about Pakistan and certainly restricted any unwinding of safety efforts, applying pressure on the non-military personnel government. Because of alliance politics and pressure from resistance groups and the military foundation, India's government has not been able to restart the harmony procedure, particularly after the attacks in Mumbai. Hence, profound mistrust originating from past misleading practices and distinctive government types on either side of the boundary hamper the harmony procedure and undermine the region.

The loss of confidence is the biggest challenge between Pakistan and India, and anything that tackled this "trust deficiency" is beneficial in the way forward. Mr. Kasuri, who held the office in 2002-07, called on the two nations' leadership to demonstrate their commitment to solving the remaining issues, said leaders should launch the peace process by resolving one another's problems, including Kashmir, Sir Creek, insurgency, Siachen, and water sharing. Kasuri stated that our relationship's future should not need to look like this. It should be more like the last one when optimistic hope was articulated and both sites dedicated themselves to irreversible dialog. He highlighted the fruitful examples of the Southeast Asian Nations Association and the European Union in regional cooperation in stressing deeper and stronger relations between India and Pakistan. The 70-year-old Pakistani leader remembered the call for the "crush of Malaysians" when he was young. ASEAN had given a strong example of how regional nations had resolved their past and encouraged regional understanding, peace, and collaboration even when they had strained and rough relations. He called on parliamentarians from both nations to improve their partiality and facilitate a greater knowledge of each other's viewpoints. He also encouraged the Pakistani and Indian media to be more vigilant in addressing controversial problems and acts of terrorism. Mr. Kasuri gave his ideas about how to tackle different issues and said that the terror dangers to India and Pakistan were such that a shared approach would lead to the end of the danger. Indian Minister Chidambaram's meeting in Islamabad with Pakistani Minister Rehman Malik offered an opportunity to make a valuable consensus on the need for cooperation on the terrorist issue. He

said that, given the political will, the Siachen problem could be solved quickly. Both parties decided to collaborate on redeploying and developing a disengagement zone in the region. The two nations' political leadership had to compromise on restricting the boundary for which technical work was carried out about the Sir Creek question (Chennai, 2016).

The Mutual Relationship

Following the 2008 attacks on Mumbai city, Pakistan and India's respective relations arrived at the absolute bottom. India took various measures and suspended the combined negotiation. However, with the rehashed vows, the two nations could not continue the discourse yet. All the more significantly, India is effectively following a protecting strategy, a blend of co-activity and control, versus Pakistan. While drawing in with Pakistan monetarily, it is putting resources into the infrastructure that sidesteps Pakistan.

Additionally, it effectively proceeds with its army modernization program, reinforcing its key partnership with America, supporting the enemy of Pakistan movements, and escalating its counter-rebellion tasks in Kashmir and different areas of India. As a responsive procedure, evading relies upon Pakistan's activities and does not help India form or impact Pakistan's conduct effectively. It scarcely helps dynamic and democratic society powers in Pakistan who selected to dismiss the account of rivalry. It forces the two nations to contend harshly in non-conventional zones, for example, Afghanistan, entrance to Central Asia, and water sharing. Also, it keeps India from completely understanding its geopolitical objectives. All the more explicitly, it isn't generally helping India to arrive at its objective of warding off incredible forces from the subcontinent (Colman, 2009: 465).

Indeed, even the procurement of atomic weapons couldn't act as a discouragement against a future battle. Both were occupied with a restricted, conventional war at Kargil (1999). Later in 2001-2, both were occupied with gigantic troop activation on the boundary, threatening to utilize even atomic weapons (Yusuf & Najam, 2009). Any attack or apparent political death in India, later on, might cause another battle between the two nations. Confronting an inauspicious future, both have taken numerous self-improvement measures to fortify themselves. Their vital accomplices are powering the weapons contest just to propel their geopolitical advantages. However, the two nations learned that there is no possible army solution for the Kashmir clash after the Kargil. Despite this acknowledgment, after the Mumbai attack, they effectively engage in weapons contest destabilizing the region. Also, both keep on pursuing the arrangement of supporting the uprising in each other's domain and contend in Afghanistan.

At last, ongoing terrorist attacks, particularly the Mumbai assault, have almost decreased the possibility of unraveling the Kashmir struggle. After the attacks in Mumbai, the Indian people's view about Pakistan has taken an emotional turn and become threatening than at any time in recent memory. The army and intelligence foundation of India have solidified their demeanor towards Pakistan. In this unfriendly atmosphere, the Indian authority requests that Pakistan stop cross-

boundary terrorism by indicting the guilty parties. Despite Pakistani-supported terrorism, India is right now confronting the issue of home-developed terrorism. All the more significantly, India isn't set up to settle on Kashmir for different reasons. It's also becoming a monetary and political issue, which demoralizes India from tolerating any outsider intercession on this matter. Thus, to conceal its internal shortcomings and abstain from participating in any simple arrangement over Kashmir, India calls for Pakistan to stop terrorism support. Then again, Pakistan has vigorously put resources in the Jihadist foundation to go up against India in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Tavares, 2008: 276).

Steps to strengthen trust

The world breathed in 2019 as Pakistan and India confront the disputed Kashmir. The threat of nuclear escalation became worryingly possible as news stories reported that nuclear-armed competitors were bombing each other's territories. The attack on an Indian paramilitary convoy in Pulwama killed 40 soldiers (BBC, 2019). Modi was compelled to punish Pakistan and enter into a favorable outcome of warfare. In the face of increasing escalation pressures, analysts dismissed the prospect of a disastrous war. However, the enduring critics were able to figure a way out of the rising crisis in the end. Pakistan returns the Indian pilot who had taken him to Kashmir (Dawn.com, 2019). The move was described by Imran Khan (Pakistani Prime Minister) as a peace gesture (Aljazeera, 2019). However, friction remained strong since the handoff with war-like language from both countries. The remarkable series of bilateral steps to establish trust introduced by both countries was one aspect of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry that attracted little coverage during the crisis.

The Indian statesman Chari stated that trust-building measures are 'initiatives pursued by antagonistic states to alleviate tensions and improve mutual trust' by military and non-military powers (STIMSON, 2012). Lasting arrangements for several decades include non-attacking nuclear sites, crisis coordination hotlines, diplomatic staff non-harassment, and airspace non-violation. A new methodological approach to trust-building measures is needed to untie South Asia's Gordian knot (Ryan, 2019). There are two kinds of trust-building measures: positive and negative. Positive measures are practical action agreements (i.e., trade agreements, prisoner exchanges, etc.), whereas negative measures forbid such destabilization acts. In brief, positive measures help build trust by forming cross-border communication patterns, while negative measures add to overall stability. Therefore, while positive measures are shock insulators, negative measures attempt in the first place to avoid such shocks.

Pakistan freed 300 Indian fishermen in 2018, and India free Pakistani fishermen after six months (PTI, 2018). And Pakistan freed another 100 Indian fishermen as a show of solidarity after the Pulwama crisis (Suhasini, 2019). It is not about making constructive trust-building measures necessarily better than negative but about doing multiple items, which politicians should consider when both parties seek a single basis for future negotiations. Mutual trust can be established, and escalation prevented by positive trust-building measures by creating partners against violent conflict resolution. While the mood for constructing a new round of trust could be poor due to the Pulwama crisis, both nations' leaders have to pay off an abundance of low-hanging fruits.

In 2014, China and America had a mutual partnership deeply fraught with mistrust and agreed on the code of unplanned encounters at sea (Nathan, 2012). The agreement formed a new mutual arrangement between the Navy to settle conflicts. To create a framework for mutual naval interaction, Pakistan and India must replicate the mutual defense model. It may be possible to establish stronger naval cooperation in the longer term, possibly in joint north Arabian anti-piracy patrols. Pakistan and India retain a large inventory of aging military gear, including the stocks of ballistic missiles. The missiles are technologically outdated, ineffective, and dangerous to practical use because of their prolonged storage period (Michael & Julia, 2013). Collaborative weapons reductions will foster trust and accountability without undermining either party's protection, including verification teams from both sides. In the past, cycles of crisis between Pakistan and India preceded new confidence-building rounds. Every major agreement between India and Pakistan has its origins in resolving crises (Feroz, 2010).

The Pulwama episode stresses the lack of escalation of the new trust-building measures. Pulwama also offers India and Pakistan a chance to come and discuss new deals on the negotiation table. For prosperity and security in regional relations, it is time for leaders in both nations to follow a new faith growth strategy, which strikes an appropriate balance between positive and negative measures. That will help restore the subcontinent's persistent mistrust, secure bilateral shock links, and resolving' prospects in the future.

Conclusion

Giving no indications of the permanent solution in the near-period, the Pakistan-Indian competition over Kashmir has continued for a century. Regardless of many components restricting a permanent solution to the competition, Kashmir is the prime reason for conflict. Various harmony negotiations, harmony deals, U.N. resolutions, and battles have not tackled this obstinate universal issue. Other than the Kashmir struggle, other regional issues, political inconsistency, hostile stands on national identity, and the lack of huge monetary and business relations do not support harmony in the Indian subcontinent. These variables likewise are peaceful solutions to the Kashmir struggle.

Besides a couple of monetary and business relations, formal mistrust, diverse government types, rivalry in non-conventional territories, the uprising, and numerous different factors, as examined before, have deferred a peaceful solution Kashmir struggle. Pakistan doubts that India's developing economic power and Indian authority on the subcontinent will influence its power and security position. Besides, Pakistan accepts that "greater" India would not settle on Kashmir. To debilitate and compel India to bargain, Pakistan connected with India in constrained clashes and smaller than usual wars. Thus, Islamabad faces the issue of over-militarization of its general public and home-developed terrorism. Participating in a weapons contest with all the more dominant neighbors, Islamabad faces the issue of the implosion of its economy, driving its kin into poverty. Also, it is proceeding with help for cross-outskirt terrorism tensions the associations with its neighbors and America. Particularly after the attack in Mumbai, the two nations commonly suspect and doubt

one another. Right now, the circumstance on the ground isn't perfect to continue the combined negotiation. The two nations need to take various measures critically to set up the ground and facilitate the stewing tensions:

1. Delhi should move away from a protecting to a commitment strategy and guarantee Pakistan of its genuine expectation to regard the latter's independence and regional integrity.
2. Delhi should handle the Kashmiris all the more humanely regarding their human rights, as appropriate in standard India.
3. Pakistan should quit putting resources into its flopped technique to support cross-outskirt terrorism and destroy the Jihadist foundation, guiding the two nations towards the battle.
4. The two nations should upgrade business and change visa guidelines.
5. The two nations should start military-to-military contact to forestall the trust deficit.

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